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INTENTIONAL SEX TORTS
Deana PollardSacks*
Intentional tort law generally protects personal autonomy and selfdetermination vigorously by requiring fair disclosure before consent to
physical contact is considered voluntary and valid. A glaring exception
exists regarding consent to sexual relations. Although American law
historically has provided remedies for fraudulent or other tortious
inducement of sexual relations, current sex tort jurisprudence offers
virtually no protection. The law's contemporary "caveat emptor"
approach to cases of sexual autonomy infringement is inappropriate
because it departsfrom fundamentalprinciples of intentionaltort doctrine.
In addition, the current law supports a 'false" norm that sexual
misappropriation is acceptable. Current law fails to protect personal
privacy and fails to effectuate its potential to influence social conduct
positively.
Intentional sex tort law should be reformed so that it is consistent with
prevailing sexual norms and principles of intentional tort doctrine.
Allegations of tortious interference with sexual autonomy should be
analyzed consistent with traditionalbattery jurisprudence bearing on the
issues of intent to offend and offensive contact. Exceptions to the defense of
consent should also be adopted. The fraud exception should apply, utilizing
established principles of materiality and justifiable reliance. In addition,
the law should acknowledge a heightened duty of disclosure between sexual
partners consistent with informed consent doctrine, to encourage honest
andfairly informedpersonal relationships.
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INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff asserts only that, in the course of their [sexual] relationship,

the defendant created a duty of honesty, but does not identify any legally
cognizable duty between parties in a dating relationship, nor are we aware
of any legally defined duty applicable in these circumstances.
Accordingly, we conclude the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted.'
We live in an era of legal nonchalance relative to a dangerous form of
personal rights infringement: sexual autonomy misappropriation. 2 The
concept that "all's fair in love" and "everybody's doing it' 3 are exploited in
1. Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); see also McPherson
v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1044-45 (Me. 1998) (holding that there is no duty to be
sexually faithful in marriage); In re Marriage of J.T., 891 P.2d 729 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that marital relationship is not a "special" relationship creating a duty of sexual
fidelity or a duty to disclose third-party sexual relations).
2. Misappropriation usually connotes conversion, a tort meaning that the defendant
intended to and did control or exercise substantial dominion over the plaintiffs chattel, and
results in liability without consciousness of wrongdoing. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS 130-36 (2000). Traditionally, only tangible personal property could be converted,
but some courts have allowed a claim where "conversion" took place electronically, and one
court has held that extracting human body parts from a live patient cannot support a
conversion claim. Id. at 135. The term "sexual misappropriation" is used loosely herein and
in conformity with Merriam-Webster's definition of "convert" (to appropriate without right)
and "appropriate" (to take or make use of without authority or right) because it captures the
essence of one person "taking" another's sexual choice manipulatively, or as if by right, and
using it as if she owned it, in derogation of the true owner's right of unfettered discretion

over sexual decisions.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

61, 273 (1lth ed.

2003). The terms "sexual fraud" and "sexual battery" may also be used at times herein and
often describe the same tortious behavior that could also be termed "sexual autonomy
misappropriation." As a legal matter, battery is the best tort theory to redress conversion of
another's sexual choice through dishonest, manipulative, or socially blameworthy means.
See infra Part III. However, "sexual battery" has criminal connotations, and sexual fraud
does not capture all forms of sexual autonomy misappropriation suggested herein, so use of
these terms is limited. For convenience, throughout this Article, the plaintiff will be deemed
masculine, and the defendant will be deemed feminine.
3. The proverb "all's fair in love and war" has been traced to John Lyly's Euphues
(1578): "The rules of fair play do not apply in love and war." First attested in the United
States in John Pendleton Kennedy's Horse-Shoe Robinson (1835), the proverb is found in
varying forms and "is frequently used to justify cheating." GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS AND SAYINGS 9 (1996). Ironically, since the
adoption of the Geneva Convention in 1864, even war has had clear rules of engagement to
avoid unnecessary suffering (albeit not always followed). See, e.g., Yale Law School, Lillian
Goldman
Law
Library,
Avalon
Project-The
Laws
of
War,
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the media despite being contrary to the prevailing sexual norm among
Americans. 4 The legal norm is "caveat emptor" (or buyer beware) in the
marketplace of sexual relationships, which fails to deter blameworthy
interpersonal deception. 5
The prevalence and resigned acceptance,
particularly among American youth, of fraudulent inducement of sexual
relations is disturbing. 6 The legal norm is bad public policy and has
supported the creation of "false" sexual norms7 that threaten this country's

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subjecLmenus/lawwar.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Love is
the only realm left without rules of fair play. Regarding "everybody is doing it," see infra
note 37.
4. See Deana A. Pollard, Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 821-24 (2007) [hereinafter
Pollard, Sex Torts]. Most Americans are far from sexually promiscuous and engage in
sexual behavior consistent with traditional norms. Id. at 783-87, 784 n.83 (citing EDWARD

0.

LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY

377 (1994) (noting that the

most current data available indicates that over 80% of Americans ages eighteen to fifty-nine
had zero or one sexual partner in the preceding year; 16% had between two and four
paitners; and only 3% had more than five partners)). However, television and other
influential media portray promiscuous and deceptive sexual practices as common in soap
operas, music videos, movies, and documentaries about young celebrities. See
PsychiatricDisorders.com,
Teenage Sex and Promiscuity, http://www.psychiatricdisorders.com/articles/waming-signs/teenage-sex.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2008). Although
only a very small percentage of Americans lead the sexual lifestyle that dominates television
and other media, its prominence in the media makes it appear ubiquitous, which creates
cognitive familiarity and acceptance. Cf Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1498-506 (2005) (discussing cognitive racial bias resulting from implicit
associations created by stereotypes and other influences); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1168-90 (1995) (discussing how
information is categorized and stored in the brain, based on exposure to messages that
become familiar and then unconsciously impact our perceptions of others in the employment
context); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking,
and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 354 (2007) (discussing stereotypes and their
influence on brain functioning, which can lead to racial bias, and suggesting methods to
reverse unconscious bias); Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis:
The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH.
L. REV. 913, 917-25 (1999) (discussing the way in which familiar material unconsciously
influences cognitive functioning and choices in the employment context). The media has
played a powerful role in creating a belief that "everybody is doing it," which tends to create
acceptance of, and entrench, the sexual attitudes and behaviors addressed herein. See
Pollard, Sex Torts, supra, at 783-87, 810-24 (arguing that Americans make sexual choices
based on morality, not physical desire, making them vulnerable to influence and
manipulation); see also infra notes 7, 37, 61.
5. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
7. Propagation of a "false consensus," which I refer to as a "false norm," encourages
antisocial sexual behavior because sex tort perpetrators rely on the false norm to justify their
behavior. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 401 (1997) (explaining that when a "false consensus" exists,
people may rely on it to engage in antisocial behavior because they believe, incorrectly, that
their behavior is typical and comports with social norms, which can also result from
selective association); see also Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 373-77 (1997) (describing the role of this false norm
phenomenon in gang activity).
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economic, cultural, psychological, moral, and physical well-being. 8 The
law should be reformed to reverse this trend. 9

8. Although there is debate about the law's impact on human choices, deterrence
theory grounded in the "rational actor" assumption-that people respond to legal incentives,
a function of price theory generally-is widely accepted. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note
4, at 812-19. Therefore, increasing the "cost" or "price" of deceptive sexual practices by
imposing tort liability may impact sexual choices more than one might expect intuitively,
similar to the way increasing the cost of drunk driving impacted drunk driving incident rates.
Id. at 815-17. Such a cost increase could inhibit deceptive and dangerous sexual behavior
that can lead to sexual disease transmission. The current lack of legal sanctions for
deceptive sexual practices probably contributed to the United States becoming the country
with the highest sexually transmitted disease (STD) rate in the industrialized world, a rate of
50 to 100 times that of other industrialized nations, with resultant costs estimated at about
ten to fifteen billion dollars per year. See Mary G. Leary, Tort Liability for Sexually
Transmitted Disease, in 88 AM. JUR. Trials § 1, at 165 (2003); AM. Soc. HEALTH ASS'N,
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES: How MANY CASES AND AT WHAT COST? 10 (Linda L.

Alexander et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter ASHA, WHAT COST?], available at
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/1445-std rep.cfm; see also Harrell W. Chesson, John M.
Blandford, Thomas L. Gift, Guoyu Tao & Kathleen L. Irwin, The Estimated DirectMedical
Cost of Sexually TransmittedDiseasesAmong American Youth, 2000, 36 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL
& REPROD. HEALTH 11 (2004) (citing, inter alia, ASHA, WHAT COST?). Costs refer to direct
medical and nonmedical costs of treating STDs. Direct medical costs include costs involved
with treating acute STDs and the sequelac of untreated or inadequately treated STDs, such as
clinician visits, hospitalization, diagnostic testing, and drug therapy. Direct nonmedical
costs include the cost of transportation to medical services. These direct costs attributable to
STDs must be distinguished from indirect medical costs such as productivity losses, lost
wages, and intangible costs such as human pain and suffering. Indirect medical costs are not
included in the estimates contained herein. See INST. OF MED., THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC:
CONFRONTING SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 7 (Thomas R. Eng & William T. Butler
eds., 1997). See generally Barbara K. Hecht & Frederick Hecht, Condoms and Sexually
2007,
May
24,
EMEDIC1NEHEALTH,
Diseases
(STDs),
Transmitted
This figure includes
http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=33590.
only the eight major STDs: HIV, Genital Human Papillomavirus (HPV), HSV-2, hepatitis
B, chlamydia, gonorrhea, thrichomoniasis, and syphilis; hepatitis C and bacterial vaginosis
were excluded. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,

Q&

A: THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG: How BIG IS

THE STD EPIDEMIC INTHE U.S.? 3 (1998) [hereinafter TIP OF THE ICEBERG], available at
http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfmn&pagel
D= 14668 (estimating that $7 billion results from HIV/AIDS, and another $10 billion a year
from other STDs); Chesson et al., supra; Douglas T. Fleming et al., Herpes Simplex Virus
Type 2 in the United States, 1976 to 1994, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1105 (1997). Texas and
New York each have costs over $600 million per year, and California's total costs are over
one billion dollars. See ASHA, WHAT COST?, supra, tbl.5; Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4,
at 782.
9. Indeed, a number of state legislatures have recently enacted revised rape statutes to
allow a rape conviction in the absence of physical force where the victim was induced by
fraud or coercion to consent to sex. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (2005); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261(5) (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-

13-503(4) (2005). On February 27, 2008, Peter Koutoujian of Massachusetts filed a similar
bill to amend the Massachusetts rape statute, which currently requires a finding of "force" to
support a rape conviction, in response to the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Suliveres
v. Commonwealth. 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007) (reversing the trial court's denial of
the defendant's motion to dismiss his rape indictment because the defendant's act in
obtaining intercourse with his twin brother's girlfriend by impersonating his twin brother
"did not involve force necessary for rape" under the existing law); see, e.g., Glen Johnson,
Legislation Seeks StricterState Rape Law, Targets Fraudand Deceit, BOSTON.COM, Feb. 28,
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Historically, American tort law regulated deceptive and other undesirable
sexual behavior resulting in emotional or dignitary harm through actions
now known as "heartbalm" or "amatory" torts.1 0 However, contemporary
jurisprudence reflects the view that a broken heart is not actionable, a view
that resulted in substantial abolition of the heartbalm torts over the past half
century. I I Today, most lawsuits alleging sexual battery or fraud without
physical injury are dismissed as a matter of law based on antiheartbalm
sentiment. 12 Yet, other intentional torts infringing personal autonomy, such
as assault, battery, and false imprisonment, are actionable without physical
injury.' 3 The deregulation of sexual fraud departs from basic intentional
tort principles. Intentional sex tort law should be reformed for this reason
alone.
Perhaps of greater concern is the fact that inconsiderate sexual attitudes
and irresponsible sexual behaviors encouraged by the false norms have
harmed-and even killed-far too many Americans. 14 The sexual disease
crisis mandates reform to effect behavioral change engaging the law's
deterrence and expressive, norm-regulating functions. Intentional sex tort
law is a prime candidate for norm regulation, because sexual norms are
esteem-based and the prevailing social norm already condemns
promiscuous and deceptive sex such that norm exposure can efficiently
produce norm "cascades" to further social policy. 15 The law is not the only
2008,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/02/28/legislation-seeks-stricterstate-rape-law targets fraud and deceit/.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.

13. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 1054 ("[W]ith intentional torts, the violation of the
plaintiffs right has generally been regarded as a kind of legal damage in itself").
14. For example, every ten seconds, an American teenager contracts a sexual disease.
See MEG MEEKER, EPIDEMIC: How TEEN SEX Is KILLING OUR KIDS 12 (2002). In 2002,

AIDS was the leading cause of death of African American women ages 25-34. See CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV/AIDS AMONG WOMEN 1 (2008); Pollard, Sex

Torts, supra note 4, at 779 n.59. The sexual disease epidemic per se necessitates a
reassessment of public policy on all levels, including the proper legal standards in cases
alleging sexual misconduct.
15. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,
2035 (1996); see also McAdams, supra note 7, at 393-95. Highly internalized norms
conform to a country's traditional value system, such as heritage (Puritan) or religion
(Christianity). Sexual deceit and manipulation is not consistent with traditional American
values, so to the extent that there is some societal acceptance that "all's fair" in sexual
relationships, including deceit, such norms are esteem-based, as opposed to highly
internalized, and therefore more amenable to legal manipulation. See Pollard, Sex Torts,
supra note 4, at 819-24, for a detailed analysis of the law's normative impact on sexual
conduct. The divergence between American sexual norms and the media's portrayal of
sexual norms can be compared to the divergence between the public's actual consensus
regarding public smoking and the media portrayal of the consensus before antismoking laws
publicized both the health risks and the majority's sentiment. People may be afraid to speak
their minds if the fact that they are in the majority is not exposed:
smokers
disproportionately represent restaurant patrons, silencing the majority who did not perceive
themselves as such. Id. at 823-24. Of course, the media's role in producing false norms
cannot be regulated directly because the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been
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or even primary tool to address the problem of irresponsible sexual conduct.
But the law can be improved considerably to educate the public and to
further social policy. Sexual autonomy infringement should be actionable
as battery actions to expose prevailing norms, sanction wrongful behavior,
and shift the costs of socially destructive behavior to the perpetrators,
16
instead of allowing cost externalization as the current law does.
This Article does not argue for the revival of the heartbalm torts. These
torts were dismantled to a large degree in recognition of their propensity to
perpetuate antifeminist sexual stereotypes, which may cause social harm
per se. 17
This Article argues that cases of sexual autonomy
misappropriation should be analyzed in accordance with gender-neutral,
traditional battery doctrine and the fraud and informed consent exceptions
to the defense of consent. This would serve to protect the sexual autonomy
of men and women alike, 18 consistent with the feminist goal of gender
equality.
interpreted to strictly scrutinize content-based regulations of speech. See, e.g., ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 932-33 (3d ed. 2006).

Education-both in school and at home-is also critical, but beyond the scope of this
Article.
16. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 795-810 (analyzing sex tort cases resulting
in sexual disease transmission, discussing the current negligence theory, and arguing that
strict liability is the superior theory where sexual disease is transmitted). Although the
sexual disease crisis may cause more serious injury than emotional distress resulting from
sexual fraud without disease, sexual fraud may impact a larger percentage of Americans and
therefore may be just as detrimental to public health as sexual disease. See infra note 61
(discussing survey results regarding the ubiquity of sexual deceit). It is an established
principle in public health that a less serious risk to a greater number of persons has a greater
overall public health impact than a more serious risk that applies to a much smaller segment
of society. See, e.g., ROBERT ROSENTHAL, META-ANALYTIC PROCEDURES FOR SOCIAL

RESEARCH 13-35 (rev. ed. 1991); Geoffrey Rose, Sick Individuals and Sick Populations,14
INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 427, 431 (2001). Presumably a far greater percentage of Americans
have been emotionally harmed by deception perpetrated by a romantic partner than are
inflicted with a sexually transmitted disease. See generally TIP OF THE ICEBERG, supra note 8;
Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 773-75.
17. See infra Part I.
18. It has been argued that gender neutrality is not possible and that "gender-neutrality
just masks systemic oppressions." Leslie Bender, Teaching Torts as If Gender Matters:
Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 115-17 (1994). Catharine A. MacKinnon
argues that women are the group from whom "sexuality is ... taken" in the same way that
workers' labor is appropriated under Marxism. See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982). However,
informal research indicates that both men's and women's sexual choices are misappropriated
in today's world, such that both genders deserve protection. See, e.g., infra note 61 (noting
the ubiquity of sexual deceit). Men's and women's damages claims may be conceived
differently. Thus, although it may be true that the "overwhelming majority of emotional
distress claims have arisen from harmful conduct by men, rather than women," see Bender,
supra, at 148, harm to men resulting from sexual deceit may be described by men more
commonly in terms of financial losses. For example, based on my own conversation with
dozens of men about this topic, their "distress" over deceit in sexual relations often centers
on financial investments in relationships that they entered into based on a woman's
misrepresentations, such as by providing financial support in an agreed-upon monogamous
relationship and later discovering that the woman is sexually involved with other men.
Thus, women may overlook men's distress from sexual deception in the same way that men
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Part I of this Article reviews historical intentional sex tort law, including
feminists' critical role in its development, and its normative impact on
public sentiment regarding sexual deceit.
Part II then discusses
contemporary intentional sex tort jurisprudence and argues that it is
inconsistent with intentional tort doctrine generally, particularly the law of
battery and the exception to consent based on fraud in the inducement.
Finally, Part III suggests that cases of sexual misappropriation should be
analyzed as battery cases, applying established principles of intent and
consent doctrine. This part further argues that, even in the absence of clear
proof of deceit, sexual contact should be actionable in the absence of fairly
informed consent where the evidence is sufficiently compelling.
I. SEXUAL NORMS AND SEX TORT LAW'S NORMATIVE IMPACT
Victorian attitudes towards sex in that era ... [made] sex a taboo
subject.... [An] allegation of sexual misconduct could create a public
scandal that could utterly ruin a person.... Victorian attitudes towards
sex have diminished and yielded to a much more frank and open attitude,
as is evident from sexually explicit material regularly published in
19
magazines, newspapers, television, movies, and books.
Historically, and through the beginning

of the twentieth

century,

American tort law offered considerable protection against socially
undesirable or deceitful sexual behavior that can fairly be termed
"intentional" torts. 20 Before the mid-nineteenth century, the focus was on
economic harm to women's fathers resulting from premarital "seduction,"
which led to the father's inability to "marry off' the daughter, and the
attendant long-term paternal support obligations. 2 1 Nineteenth century
feminists organized moral reform societies to lobby state legislators to enact
laws penalizing seduction to protect women from its devastating social and
financial consequences in an era of Victorian sexual norms even before
22
they organized an effort to seek suffrage.

(and the law generally) may overlook the degree of emotional harm women experience as a
result of sexual coercion and deceit. The gender-neutral battery paradigm proposed herein
would allow a plaintiff to plead and prove the full gamut of tort damages-general and
special compensatory damages, and punitive damages where appropriate-based on his or
her individual experience.
Perhaps most importantly, the gender-neutral paradigm
recognizes that some men experience emotional pain similar to female victims of sexual
deceit, and some women suffer economic losses as a result of sexual deceit similar to men's
stereotypical experiences. If gender neutrality is not possible, a flexible gender-neutral
paradigm for sexual misappropriation may nonetheless be the best tort remedy for this form
of harmful sexual behavior so that the jury-the barometer of minimal civil expectations and
requirements-can make injury assessments and damages awards in individual cases.
19. Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991).
20. See, e.g., Jane E. Larson, "Women UnderstandSo Little, They Call My Good Nature
'Deceit'": A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 383-84 (1993); see
also infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
21. Larson, supra note 20, at 382-86.
22. Id. at 391-93.

1058

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

By the late 1800s, the law began to recognize that premarital sex based
on seduction harmed not just fathers' property interests, but women's
personal interests in social standing, reputation, and ability to become
financially secure, whether by marriage or by gainful employment. 2 3 These
cases often involved allegations that the plaintiff was tricked into premarital
sex by virtue of her lover's marriage promises, thereby suffering a complete
loss of social standing and esteem, particularly when a child was
conceived. 24 Thus, in the decades surrounding the turn of the century,
American courts entertained "heartbalm" torts, 25 such as seduction 26 and
breach of marriage promise, to compensate fathers, and later the women
themselves, for damages resulting from premarital sex. 27 Indeed, by the
latter part of the nineteenth century, actions for seduction were among the
most common forms of civil actions and were usually successful. 2 8 The
theory unifying the various heartbalm torts 2 9 was that women needed the

23. Id. at 386-87.
24. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Agency and Partnership: A Study of Breach of Promise
Plaintiffs, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9-11 (1989). Fathers were considered victims of their
daughters' seduction starting in the mid-seventeenth century, since the father could have
trouble marketing "damaged" (nonvirgin) goods in the marriage marketplace. They thus
suffered economic losses as a result of their daughters' dependence on them, and loss of
services as well if pregnancy resulted. See Larson, supra note 20, at 382-85.
25. See infra note 29. Other heartbalm actions were also available to men whose
women were converted to the use of others. For example, alienation of affections provided a
remedy for a third party's interference with a marital relationship that destroyed the affection
that existed between spouses prior to the interference. This tort was known as "enticement"
in English common law and could be brought against any meddling third party, even without
sexual involvement, such as mothers-in-law. Some scholars assert that "alienation of
affections did not. .. evolve from enticement." Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old
Flame: Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 61,
66-67 (1999). Criminal conversation was another tort that provided a remedy for a third
party's adulterous relationship with a plaintiffs spouse. This tort was a strict liability tort,
as there were no real defenses, such as the spouse living alone and representing herself to be
unmarried. This tort was known as "seduction" in English common law. See Jones, supra, at
66-68.
26. Seduction went through some changes in American law. This tort was codified in
many states beginning in Iowa in 1851 and allowed women to sue in their own names for
damages resulting from the devastating social injury that resulted at that time from
premarital sex or unwed motherhood. See Larson, supra note 20, at 385-86.
27. See id. at 382-85, 394 & n.85.
28. Id. at 383-84
29. The four torts generally referred to as the amatory or heartbalm torts are (1)
alienation of affections (a third party causes estrangement between spouses); (2) criminal
conversation (a third party's adulterous relationship with a plaintiff's wife, usually); (3)
seduction (an unmarried woman's father-and, since the mid-nineteenth century, the woman
herself--could sue for damages grounded in social injury resulting from premarital sex or
unwed motherhood); and (4) breach of marriage promise (a promise of future marriage
induced a woman to engage in sexual behavior that she would not have but for the promise
and expectation of marriage). See, e.g., William R. Corbett, A Somewhat Modest Proposalto
Prevent Adultery and Save Families: Two Old Torts Looking for a New Career, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 985, 1002-03 (2001); Larson, supra note 20, at 385-86, 394 n.85; Jones, supra note
25, at 65, 67-69.
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law's protection from men's intellectual persuasion and sexual influence. 30
Early-twentieth-century feminists balked at the concept that women's
power and self-worth should be defined primarily by their relationships
with men, whether the relationship was marriage or a less respectable
sexual liaison. 3 1 By the 1930s, female legal reformers began to view the
law as paternalistic and to equate civil actions grounded in seduction with
obsolete and harmful stereotypes portraying women as economically
dependent upon men and easily influenced by men's power and persuasive
charm. 32 They felt that such stereotypes-and the attendant misogynist
portrayal of women as "gold-diggers" by the media-undermined the
concept of the newly emancipated woman, including social equality,
economic independence, and sexual freedom. 33 Feminists supported the
first antiheartbalm movement during this era based on a progressive view of
34
women's role in society and seduction law's paternalistic connotations.
Efforts to keep "broken heart" claims out of the court system by
abolishing the heartbalm torts began in the 1930s but were fairly
unsuccessful until the 1960s. 35 The "sexual revolution" 36 and attendant
sweeping rejection of traditional American values, spurred in part by the
release of the Kinsey reports, 37 women's reproductive freedom resulting
30. Originally, the torts emanated from the concept that women were their fathers'
chattels and, if their marriage potential was damaged due to premarital sex, the fathers
suffered property damages grounded in their daughters' maintenance, since it was hard to
marry off damaged goods. See Larson, supra note 20, at 382-83. Later, the torts mutated to
redress injury to reputation and emotional harm to the woman herself who suffered as a
result of men's trickery or sexual deceit. Id. at 390-91.
31. See id. at 397-98.
32. See, e.g., id. at 393-401.
33. See Coombs, supra note 24, at 4-7. Early feminists viewed seduction torts as
counterproductive to advancing women's personal power and sexuality, and believed that
"'as long as women seek to profit materially from their relationships with men ... there will
be no new era for the sex as a whole."' Id. at 13 (quoting Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, Breach
of Promise-Why?, 12 WOMAN CITIZEN 8, 40 (1927)).
34. See Larson, supra note 20, at 393-401.
35. Indiana's enactment of the "Act to promote public morals" initiated the movement,
abolishing all of the heartbalm torts. See Act of Mar. 11, 1935, ch. 208, § 1, 1935 Ind. Acts
1009 (codified at IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-12-2-1 (LexisNexis 1998)); Corbett, supra note 29,
at 1007-08. Other states quickly proposed similar legislation, and much of the rhetoric
surrounding the new legislation was misogynistic, focusing on the "gold diggers" who
blackmailed money from men through sex tort vehicles. See, e.g., Corbett, supra note 29, at
1007-10; Larson, supra note 20, at 394-401, 446-47. Yet, although twenty-three states
considered antiheartbalm legislation in 1935, only eight states had passed such legislation by
1950. See Corbett, supra note 29, at 1008.
36. The sexual revolution of the 1960s was really the second American sexual
revolution, the first one having taken place in the 1930s when women joined the work force
and became more financially and sexually liberated. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at
790 n.120. Early feminists sought freedom from paternalistic laws grounded in the concept
of women as property, and the first antiheartbalm movement ensued. See id. at 789.
37. Alfred Kinsey's "scientific" data on men's sexuality and women's sexuality were
published in 1948 and 1953, respectively, and, despite having serious methodological errors
and probably gross inaccuracies, were instant best sellers and had an enormous impact on
Americans' perceptions of Americans' sexual practices. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 231 (2002); ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B.
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from the availability of the birth control pill, 38 and popularization of
pornography (through periodicals such as Playboy), had an enormous
impact on tort law and criminal law: the sexual revolution became a legal
revolution. 39 Convergent with the sexual revolution of the 1960s, 40 and in
large part influenced by the feminist movement and radical departure from
traditional sexual norms, courts and legislatures began to eviscerate the
heartbalm torts. During this era, feminists focused on legal reform to
protect women from rape and sexual harassment, 4 1 which were viewed as
POMEROY & CLYDE MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953); ALFRED C.
KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR INTHE HUMAN MALE

(1948). Kinsey has been dubbed a sexual pervert and a "scientific fraud" and ultimately died
of "orchitis," a lethal infection of the testicles caused by masochistic masturbation. Judith A.
Reisman, Crafting Bi/Homosexual Youth, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 312 (2002). Of far
greater concern is the probability that Kinsey's false report had a great impact on
Americans' sexual practices, i.e., the belief in Kinsey's "scientific" data probably
contributed to people's subsequent, riskier sexual behavior, based on the belief that
"everybody is doing it." See ROBERT T. MICHAEL, JOHN H. GAGNON, EDWARD 0. LAUMANN
& GINA KOLATA, SEX INAMERICA 20 (1994); Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 819-24.

What is clear is that prior to Kinsey's publications regarding male and female sexual
behavior, the only common sexually transmitted diseases were gonorrhea and syphilis, both
bacterial and both usually easily treatable with antibiotics, but now, the sexual disease
epidemic involves so many incurable, viral infections that they cannot even be counted
accurately. Id. at 772-81.
38. BERNARD ASBELL, THE PILL:

A BIOGRAPHY OF THE DRUG THAT CHANGED THE

WORLD 156-80 (1995).
39. Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 790-91; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at
230-37.
40. This period, of course, involved a sweeping rejection of traditional American values.
Traditional beliefs about sexual morality and gender roles were abandoned as more women
moved from the home into the workforce and, perhaps above all, women gained substantial
control over their reproductive function by the development of the birth control pill. Some
scholars believe that this control over childbirth ushered in an "era of liberated sexual
practices, where openness and sexual freedom would reign." See EDWARD A. WYNNE &
KEVIN RYAN, RECLAIMING OUR SCHOOLS:

TEACHING CHARACTER, ACADEMICS, AND

DISCIPLINE 225-26 (2d ed. 1997). "[S]ex came out of the closet and into the streets, and
consensual sex outside of marriage, masturbation, cohabitation, birth control, and even
abortion became more accepted." Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 791.
41. See Larson, supra note 20, at 400-01. For a comprehensive overview of feminist
tort scholarship, see Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL
L. REV. 575 (1993). Recent feminist scholarship has addressed a number of aspects of tort
law, including the "reasonable woman" standard, the gender-disparate realities of the "no
duty" rule, and types of injuries that are disproportionately suffered by women, such as
emotional distress. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Feminist Approaches to Tort Law, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5-19 (2001). See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.

1087 (1986); Catharine MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 199 (2003); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 139 (2005). One feminist scholar has characterized the
various feminist schools of thought in tort jurisprudence as three recurring "moves": (1)
suspicion of explicit sex-based distinctions; (2) revelation of implicit male bias in "genderneutral" rules and law; and (3) focus on female experiences and how the law may fail to
recognize gender-based experiences and injuries. See Martha Chamallas, Importing Feminist
Theories to Change Tort Law, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 389, 390-93 (1997). Perhaps
fundamentally, as a broad statement, feminists seek foremost to "increase women's sphere of
consensual freedom" to make it equal to that of men, since "there exists a correlation
between objectively equal distributions of power-including sexual power-and
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direct assaults on women's personal autonomy 42 and ability to achieve
economic independence. 4 3 To the contrary, theories underlying the
heartbalm torts were still considered antithetical to gender equality and
women's self-determination."
The mid-twentieth-century movement to
abolish the heartbalm torts was quite successful: today, only a handful of
states entertain actions grounded in sexual deceit in the absence of sexual
45
disease transmission.
The demise of the heartbalm torts also reflected the mainstream judicial
and public sentiment of that era that sexual matters had no place in court
and even "'diminishe[d] human dignity.' 46 Indeed, some courts found that
allegations of sexual misconduct no longer carried social stigma as a result
of ubiquitous sexually explicit material in the media and its apparent public
acceptance. 47 The law's resultant caveat emptor 48 approach to sexual
misconduct sent a clear message to the American public: the government is
unconcerned with unfair or manipulative sexual behavior, even when one
person misappropriates another's sexual autonomy via blatant fraud.
Ironically, this "progressive" legal/sexual revolution took place in an era
when sexual disease was a nonissue, and the resultant legal norm probably
exacerbated the very attitude that the heartbalm torts sought to control
originally, that is, the attitude that "all's fair in love," which in turn
encouraged socially undesirable sexual behavior conducive to sexual
49
disease proliferation.

subjectively happy and good lives." See Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 149,
160, 181-82 (2000). The gender-neutral paradigm proposed herein seeks to provide a
vehicle through which both women and men can seek recovery of damages for harmful
sexual choice misappropriation, recognizing that ultimately it is up to the litigants and their
attorneys to reshape and reform the contours of the law based on individual experience. The
paradigm, if properly engaged, would advance women's (and men's) sexual autonomy and
self-determination by providing a remedy for sexual choice misappropriation that ultimately
should create deterrence to dishonest sexual dealings.
42. See generally Larson, supra note 20, at 400-01.
43. See, e.g., Dan Subotnik, "Hands Off': Sex, Feminism, Affirmative Consent, and the
Law of Foreplay, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249, 252-66 (2007).
44. See Larson, supra note 20, at 393-401.
45. See Corbett, supra note 29, at 989 & n.7; Dan Subotnik, "Sue Me, Sue Me, What
Can You Do to Me? I Love You": A Disquisition on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 FLA. L. REV.
311, 321-24 (1995). See also infra Part It for a discussion of current law allowing cases to
go forward where disease is transmitted, but not allowing cases to go forward generally
where no disease is transmitted. For a recent case recognizing alienation of affections and
criminal conversation, see Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
46. Feldman v. Feldman, 480 A.2d 34, 36 (N.H. 1984) (citing Lynn v. Shaw, 620 P.2d
899, 902 (Okla. 1980)); see also Jones, supra note 25, at 72-73.
47. See, e.g., Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991) (noting that allegations
of sexual misconduct no longer create a public scandal that could ruin a person). Today,
"Victorian attitudes towards sex have diminished ... as is evident from sexually explicit
material regularly published in magazines, newspapers, television, movies, and books." Id.
48. See Larson, supra note 20, at 413 ("Ironically, the principle of caveat emptor
remains most vigorously alive in the sexual marketplace.").
49. See generally supra note 37.
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The current legal norm does not accurately reflect prevailing sexual
norms yet influences people's perception of them. 50 Comprehensive
research reveals that the vast majority of Americans are monogamous. Yet,
young Americans are sexually active at a younger age, have more sexual
partners than in prior generations, and believe that dishonesty in sexual
relationships is typical. 5 1 The false sexual norms created by the media's
portrayal of atypical sexual behavior as the standard, and the legal norm of
caveat emptor, probably influenced sexual attitudes and behaviors that have
52
given rise to an American sexual disease epidemic.
In shaping jurisprudence relative to sexual conduct, it is important to
consider the law's impact on norms and, in turn, norms' impact on human
behavior. 53 Despite controversy regarding the law's influence on human
behavior, there is substantial empirical evidence that the law can create and

50. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 783-87, 821-22.
51. Most Americans are monogamous and behave sexually in a way that reflects
internalized sexual norms grounded in traditional concepts of sexual morality. See id. at
783-87. For a detailed discussion of the law's probable normative impact on Americans'
sexual attitudes, see id. at 810-24. American teens and Canadian teens rank among the
youngest for age of first sexual intercourse experience, with some studies showing that half
of eighth graders have engaged in sexual intercourse. Id. at 780-81; see also infra notes 6061.
52. See supra note 37. The statistical chronology of sexually transmitted disease rate
increases speaks for itself. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 772-81. Researchers
believe that a very small percentage of Americans are responsible for the vast majority of
sexual disease transmissions: a "core" group of sexually active Americans consisting of
probably less than 3% of Americans have more than five sexual partners per year, and the
number of sexual partners is directly related to the chances of contracting and spreading
sexual diseases, making these sexually active, multiple-partner Americans responsible for
the vast majority of sexual disease transmission cases in the United States. Id. at 783-84. If
this group were deterred (by the law or otherwise) to stop transmitting sexual diseases,
theorists believe that all sexually transmitted diseases would die out, since the antigens
responsible for sexual diseases need new bodies to stay in circulation. Id. at 783-87; see also
id.at 795-803. Unfortunately, the sexual disease epidemic has harmed women
disproportionately in an unforeseeable manner: women are physically more vulnerable to
contracting sexual disease. See generally id. at 772-803, 776 n.41, 777 n.42, 779 n.59, 780
nn.63-64 (arguing that current law's failure to regulate sexual relations after the demise of
the heartbalm torts, and current courts' ineffective application of negligence and intentional
tort theories of liability in sex tort cases, have been factors leading to the current
unprecedented sexual disease epidemic).
53. For example, when Sweden became the first country to ban child corporal
punishment in 1979, no enforcement mechanisms or sanctions were created. Deana Pollard,
Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REv. 575, 588 (2003). The law merely
informed parents that Sweden had made it illegal to hit a child as a form of discipline. Id.
While originally most parents were against the new law, the law created a new social
standard that was followed, and today, the vast majority of Swedes favor the law. See id. at
588-89, 588-89 nn.67-77 (citing Joan E. Durrant, The Swedish Ban on Corporal
Punishment: Its History and Effects, in FAMILY VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: A
CHALLENGE FOR SOCIETY 19, 23-25 (Dettev Frehsee et al. eds., 1996)); see also Peter H.
Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and
Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 404 (1994) ("[L]aws create and
maintain order... through the creation or alteration of social norms."); Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 471 (1997) ("Criminal law's
influence comes from [it] being a societal mechanism .. ").
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shape social norms to advance public welfare. 54 In the past decade in
particular, it has become accepted that the public's perception of social
norms impacts personal choices substantially, perhaps more so than legal
sanctions per se, because people are social creatures who place enormous
value on one another's esteem. 5 5 The law's failure to sanction behavior
that damages others can impact how people view such behavior
emotionally, cognitively, economically (based on the rational actor
assumption), and morally. 56 For example, legislative efforts to control
other types of behavior not intuitively amenable to rational choice, such as
drunk driving, have been very successful. 5 7 Inferentially, the contemporary
absence of legal sanctions for sexual misappropriation, 58 and attendant
perception that the costs of sexually irresponsible behavior may be
completely externalized, has encouraged

sexual promiscuity, 59 sexual

60
deceit, and sexually irresponsible behavior contrary to public policy.
Young Americans' perception of the ubiquity of sexual deceit-and
resigned acceptance of such-is a sad testament to our society's failure to
take seriously the social harm that may be produced in part by a legal norm

54. For example, stricter drunk driving laws have had a clear and socially positive
impact on incidents of drunk driving over the past twenty years, demonstrating that the
public does respond to deterrent policies. See Dale E. Berger & William D. Marelich, Legal
and Social Control of Alcohol-Impaired Driving in California: 1983-1994, 58 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 518, 518-20 (1997). For additional support of the law's influence on norms and
behavior, see Kahan, supra note 7, at 394-95; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,
88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1055 (2000); David T. Lykken, Psychopathy, Sociopathy, and Crime,
34 SOCIETY 29, 31 (1996); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrencein Tort Law,
42 U. KAN. L. REv. 115 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 903, 951-52 (1996).
55. Wanda Foglia, Perceptual Deterrence and the Mediating Effect of Internalized
Norms Among Inner-City Teenagers, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 415 (1997); Donald
C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1499, 1505-06 (1998); Lawrence
Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2181, 2187 (1996);
McAdams, supra note 7. See generally Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral
Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. Rev. 1551 (1998); Sunstein, supra note 15; Sunstein,
supra note 54.
56. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 810-24.
57. See Berger & Marelich, supra note 54, at 518-20.
58. This has led one legal commentator to conclude that "[t]he current lack of penalties
for adultery and interference with family relationships is shockingly new." Jones, supra note
25, at 64.
59. Promiscuous sexual behavior, or "promiscuity," is not intended to carry a moral
connotation but means "not restricted to one sexual partner." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

supra note 2, at 994 (defining "promiscuous").
60. The law's historical shift from relatively certain liability for unfair seduction to
virtually no consequences for blatant sexual choice conversion in the absence of disease
transmission has undoubtedly impacted sexual attitudes. Although all courts that have
addressed the issue of liability for transmitting a sexual disease have determined that liability
is appropriate if negligence is proven, few courts have sustained intentional tort theories of
recovery in the absence of disease transmission. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 793803. Regarding the law's impact on social norms, see id. at 819-24.
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY,
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that is inconsistent with the prevailing social norm: a false norm can be
61
self-fulfilling in the absence of intervention.
The public's perception of contemporary sexual norms may be relatively
easily influenced by the law because they are esteem-based as opposed to
highly internalized, i.e., based on contemporary values as opposed to deeply
entrenched, traditional American values, such as those consistent with
Christianity or Puritanism. 62 Creating, and in this case exposing, sexual
norms consistent with public policy can effectively create positive
behavioral change and would be costless. 63 New laws, or the use of
traditional battery law analysis in sex tort cases, could attract media
attention, 64 would eventually influence sexual norms consistent with public
health and public policy, and should be adopted.

61. See supra note 37. Informal research demonstrates that most people believe that
sexual fraud is not actionable, and some people feel that caveat emptor is appropriate, since
the world is not a nice place and people need to learn to be wary of others, particularly in the
sexual context. See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 45, at 393 n.449 (magazine poll revealed that
most people would not sue for sexual deceit essentially because it is so common). This
accepting attitude toward sexual deceit, ubiquitous in the media, common among young
Americans, and even expressed in judicial sentiment, is self-perpetuating. It has created a
perception that neither candor nor basic civility is required in sexual relations and has
contributed to the sexual disease epidemic. This is bad public policy, has caused tremendous
human suffering, and is becoming extremely costly. Education and discussion in public
forums and television could effectively reverse the apparent trend toward acceptance of
sexual dishonesty. In addition, strengthening legal sanctions for deceptive sexual practices
could open up public discourse, attract media attention, and ultimately create different
attitudes toward sex, leading to more socially desirable, healthier sexual norms.
62. See McAdams, supranote 7, at 386-90.
63. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 819-24; see also Sunstein, supra note 15, at
2026-29.
64. To the extent that plaintiffs have won sex tort cases, they have drawn tremendous
media attention and have become common knowledge, which impacts people's perception of
the behaviors resulting in liability and impacts their feelings about such behaviors. For
example, when Georgia healthcare worker Sonia Elliott sued Atlanta Falcons quarterback
Michael Vick for giving her genital herpes in 2003, the story was all over the news, no doubt
in part because Vick had signed a $130 million contract with the Falcons and is a public
figure, but also because these lawsuits are public interest stories and many people do not
know that herpes transmission can create civil liability. See Settlement Reached in Michael
Vick Herpes Case, NBC SPORTS, Apr. 24, 2006, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12468203/.
Similarly, a Harris County (Houston, Texas) jury awarded Michelle Rudolph $950,000
($475,000 for assault and $475,000 for negligence) in a lawsuit filed against Los Angeles
Dodgers pitcher Jose Lima, who gave her genital herpes. See Lima Plans Appeal After He's
Hit
with
Sizable
Damage Award,
CBS
SPORTS,
Dec.
3,
2004,
http://cbs.sportsline.com/mlb/story/7955468. In a well-publicized case that became a 1999
Lifetime television movie entitled The Price of a Broken Heart (1999), Dorothy "Dot"
Hutelmyer discovered that her insurance executive husband had been having an affair with
his secretary for years and did not just sue for divorce, but sued the secretary for criminal
conversation and alienation of affections (heartbalm torts that survived in North Carolina,
but the case could have been brought as an intentional infliction of emotional distress case in
a state that had abolished those torts). See Hutelmyer v. Cox, 514 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999), appeal dismissed, 542 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 2000); see also IMDb: The Internet Movie
Database, The Price of a Broken Heart (1999) (TV), http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0210921/plotsummary (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (describing the plot of the movie). In
1997, a North Carolina jury ordered the husband's adulterous lover to pay his wife one
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II. CURRENT INTENTIONAL SEX TORT ANALYSIS

There are many wrongs which in themselves are flagrant. For instance,
such wrongs as betrayal, brutal words, and heartless disregard of the
feelings of others are beyond any effective legal remedy in any practical
administration of law. To attempt to correct such wrongs or give relief
from their effects may do more social damage than if the law leaves them
65
alone.
"'[P]ublic policy no longer considers money damages appropriate for
66
what is perceived as only an ordinary broken heart."'
So bachelors, and other men on the make, fear not. It is still not illegal to
feed a girl a line, to continue the attempt [to obtain sex], not to take no for
[A] male [will] make
a final answer, at least not the first time ....
promises that will not be kept .... indulge in exaggeration and hyperbole,

or ... assure any trusting female that, as in the ancient fairy tale, the ugly
frog is really the handsome
prince. Every man is free, under the law, to
67
be a gentleman or a cad.

million dollars after deciding that the husband's secretary lured him away from his wife and
family. See Hutelmyer, 514 S.E.2d 554; Terry Carter, 'She Done Me Wrong': A Jury
Agrees, Awarding a Jilted Wife $1 Million in an Alienation of Affection Suit Against the
'Other Woman,' A.B.A. J., Oct. 2007, at 24. In an interview with Dateline NBC, jurors
stated that they wanted to send a message about marriage and morality and make clear that
"homewreckers" were wrong. Dateline NBC: Three's Company (NBC television broadcast
Dec. 15, 1997) (transcript on file with the Fordham Law Review). Dateline NBC described
Dorothy Hutelmyer's case against her husband's secretary as a "symbol for the prevailing
thoughts about marriage and relationships in this area." Id. The secretary-defendant later
stated that, in retrospect, she would not have dated Joe Hutelmyer under the circumstances,
and would have waited until he was divorced before seducing him. Id. These high profile
cases demonstrate that, to the extent that sex tort law is reformed and cases involving sexual

deceit are allowed to go to trial, the media will respond, thereby increasing public awareness
and impacting perceptions of sexual misconduct.
65. C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (citation
omitted) (quoting Richard P. v. Superior Court, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that a defendant who lied about his
marital status and claimed that he had a vasectomy was not responsible for compensatory or
punitive damages in connection with misrepresentations where normal, healthy baby
resulted). This decision is consistent with the vast majority of jurisdictions in relation to
wrongful conception jurisprudence, in that recovery is limited or denied where a healthy
baby is born. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 793-801. The courts have reasoned that the
benefits of a healthy baby outweigh child-rearing costs, resulting in no net "damages." See
id. at 798-99. But see Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603, 612 (N.M. 1991)
(parents of healthy baby resulting from negligent sterilization can recover costs of raising
child from birth to adulthood).
66. Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 938 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting Note,
HeartbalmStatutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1770, 1778 (1985)).
67. People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912, 922 (Sup. Ct. 1975). Although this is a criminal
case, the sentiment expressed applies equally to civil cases. In People v. Evans, the
defendant was charged with criminal rape for admittedly using false premises and "head
games" to induce women into his apartment by claiming to be a psychologist, whereupon he
seduced them by means that were very intimidating and despicable, but, according to the
court, fell just short of rape. Id. at 921. The court cited various cases explaining that fraud,
no matter how despicable, does not vitiate consent for purposes of criminal rape. Id. at 91819 (citing, inter alia, Lewis v. Alabama, 30 Ala. 54 (1857); Alabama v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765
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The fact that judges-powerful leaders in our communities-have the
audacity to publish such sentiment in sexual fraud and rape cases reflects an
inappropriate "boys will be boys" mentality and underscores the need for
legal reform. Since the main sex tort vehicles for recovery of general
damages in the absence of physical injury-the heartbalm torts 6 8-have
been abolished in most states, 69 victims of sexual deceit have filed civil
lawsuits for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.
However, despite the generally comprehensive self-determination
protection afforded by intentional tort theory, plaintiffs in these cases have
had little success in the absence of physical injury in accordance with
antiheartbalm sentiment. Courts are usurping the jury's fact-finding role in
sexual deceit cases and dismissing them based on antiheartbalm sentiment
as a matter of law. 70 Indeed, several scholars have commented on the
grossly disparate analysis employed in economic fraud cases versus sexual
fraud cases. 7 1 The demise of the heartbalm torts has thus created a sharp
division in tort law between cases involving fraudulent inducement of
72
sexual relations and other types of autonomy infringement.
In the typical sexual deceit case, the plaintiff learns some time
subsequent to the sexual contact that his consent to sex was induced by
deception. In general, the issue of whether fraud vitiates consent to
physical contact after the fact is a question of fact to be determined in
accordance with all of the evidence. 73 However, when a person learns of
fraud in the inducement of sex after the fact, the established fraud exception
to consent has generally been disregarded, based on the "privacy" of sexual
negotiation and the supposed "difficulty" in deciding whether the fraud or

(1844)). The court's statements exemplify the attitude toward the relationship between fraud
and consent in sex cases. Fortunately, the defendant in this case, although acquitted of rape,
was foolish enough to escape police custody at one point and so was convicted of attempted
escape from police custody. Id. at 922. Despite the fact that feminists supported the
antiheartbalm movement, the concept that men can be "cads," while women have to just deal
with it, is antifeminist because it fails to recognize the emotional impact such behavior can
have on women and fails to acknowledge that both men and women lie in personal
relationships, instead relying on the assumption that women are duped by men.
68. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.

69. Some states are still in the process of abolishing heartbalm torts. See, e.g., Neal v.
Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 875 (Idaho 1994) (finding that Idaho no longer recognizes criminal
conversation). For more information on criminal conversation, see DOBBS, supra note 2, at
1246.

70. Larson, supra note 20, at 401-12 (explaining that a minority of jurisdictions will
entertain actions for sexual deceit, and compensation is limited); see also, e.g., Keenan D.
Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "JudicialActivism," 92 CAL. L. REv. 1441,
1444 (2004) (describing the various derogatory connotations of "judicial activism," all of
which involve judges improperly usurping power properly belonging to other democratic

entities). Juries representing society at large should be deciding questions of minimal civil
expectations in social settings, not individual judges who are disproportionately older, white
males. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 4, at 373-87.
71. Larson, supra note 20, at 412.
72. See infra Part III.
73. See infra Part III.C. 1.
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manipulation involved was sufficiently material to vitiate consent. 74 This
may explain why fraud-based sexual battery claims resulting in a sexual
disease have been much more successful 75 than fraud-based sexual battery
claims where no disease was transmitted: it seems objectively obvious that
sexual disease would materially impact sexual consent. 76 Courts seem
uncomfortable trying sexual deceit cases lacking tangible physical injury.
For example, in a recent Massachusetts case, Conley v. Romeri,7 7 the
court of appeals declined to recognize that the defendant's dishonesty
regarding his potential to have children could vitiate his girlfriend's sexual
consent, affirming the summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 78 The
plaintiff alleged that she informed the defendant that she was over forty and
wanted children, and that the defendant told her not to worry about it
because he had already fathered four children and a psychic told him that he
would father two more children. 79 The truth was, he had undergone a
vasectomy years prior and mislead the plaintiff about his ability and desire
to have more children. The plaintiff claimed that, since she had made clear
her intent to find a partner with whom to have children, making it material
to her sexual decision, the defendant's omission of the fact of his
vasectomy, and various affirmative representations regarding his intent to
father more children, materially impacted her decision to engage in sexual
80
relations such that her consent was vitiated by fraud in the inducement.

74. See, e.g., infra notes 81-84, 148 and accompanying text.
75. Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a defendant's
fraudulent concealment of the disease that he transmitted via intercourse constituted battery);
Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an action for
damages brought by woman against man for contraction of genital herpes was not barred by
the right of privacy or the seduction statute); Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 352-53 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that wife's consent to sex with husband was vitiated by his
failure to inform her of his genital warts, and wife's consent without knowledge was the
equivalent of no consent) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B illus. 5 (1977)

("A consents to sexual intercourse with B, who knows that A is ignorant of the fact that B
has a venereal disease. B is subject to liability to A for battery.")); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d
1175, 1179-80 (Md. 1988) (holding that a cause of action for fraud existed where a nurse
alleged that a doctor had genital herpes, was aware of his disease, and nonetheless had sex
with her without telling her, causing her to contract herpes); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d
103, 108-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing a claim for fraudulent transmission of herpes
upon a showing that the defendant knew she had the disease and was silent, allowing the
plaintiff to contract the disease); Plaza v. Estate of Wisser, 626 N.Y.S.2d 446, 449-50 (App.
Div. 1995) (noting that the homosexual defendant failed to tell his partner/plaintiff that his
former partner died of AIDS, and that the plaintiff contracted HIV from the defendant);
Dubovsky v. Dubovsky, 725 N.Y.S.2d 832, 836 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that one spouse
failing to tell the other of sexual disease can constitute fraud); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E.
206, 210 (N.C. 1920) (ruling that a husband was liable to his wife for infecting her with
venereal disease); De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
(recognizing a woman's cause of action against a man for fraudulently inducing her to have
sex without telling her he had an STD); see also Leary, supra note 8, § 6, 189-93.
76. See infra Part III.C. 1 (regarding the legal standard for when fraud vitiates consent).
77. 806 N.E.2d 933 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
78. Id. at 938-39.
79. Id. at 935.
80. Id. at 935-36.

1068

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

The court stated that it was "aware of no jurisprudential standards that
[could] be applied in such circumstances,"8 1 that "there is no recognized
standard of conduct by which [it] reasonably [could] assess the materiality
of the alleged misrepresentation," and that claims such as these "'arise from
conduct so intensely private that the courts should not be asked to nor
attempt to resolve such claims.... In summary... a court should not
define any standard of conduct therefor."'82 The Conley court determined
as a matter of law that the defendant's statements, made early in the
relationship, "may be seen only as an inducement to continue dating," not

81. Id. at 937; see also Doe v. Moe, 827 N.E.2d 240, 244-45 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005)
("We must determine whether the application of a standard of reasonable care to private
consensual sexual conduct is appropriate or even workable.... There are no comprehensive
legal rules to regulate consensual sexual behavior, and there are no commonly accepted
customs or values that determine parameters for the intensely private and widely diverse
forms of such behavior. In the absence of a consensus of community values or customs
defining normal consensual sexual conduct, a jury or judge cannot be expected to resolve a
claim that certain consensual sexual conduct is undertaken without reasonable care."
(footnote omitted)). Ironically, Americans' sexual practices and customs are more
understood now than ever before, based on extensive research on human sexuality. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 37; Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 783-87. This "lack of
standards" rhetoric is strikingly similar to most courts' rationales for dismissing wrongful
life cases, based on the "impossibility" of determining whether life may ever constitute
damages. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) ("Whether it is
better never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a
mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians."). These courts
dismiss claims as a matter of law that they implicitly recognize should be fully considered
by reference to cultural beliefs, philosophy, prevailing moral convictions, and even common
knowledge, that is, consideration that could and should be given to a jury. See DOBBS, supra
note 2, at 355 (noting that it is the jury's role to make normative decisions).
82. Conley, 806 N.E.2d at 937 (third alteration in original) (quoting Stephen K. v. Roni
L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 619-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)). The court also stated that, while
dishonesty in a personal relationship may be blameworthy, it is not compensable, as the
amatory (heartbalm) torts have been abolished in recognition that public policy no longer
considers money damages appropriate for what is perceived as only an ordinary broken
heart. Id. at 939 n.5 (citing HeartbalmStatutes and Deceit Actions, supra note 66, at 1778).
The court also relied on Stephen K. v. Roni L. in determining that fraudulent inducement to
sexual relations grounded in fertility dishonesty is not actionable. Conley, 806 N.E.2d at
936-37. However, the Stephen K.court, in dicta, stated that "court[s] [should not] supervise
the promises made between two consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private
sexual conduct," Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620, and that courts "should not define any
standard of conduct" relative to the highly intimate nature of the sexual relationship, id. One
court held that Stephen K. can be readily distinguished on far more pertinent grounds. See
Conley, 806 N.E.2d at 939 n.7. In Stephen K., any damages award to the plaintiff/father,
who allegedly became a father only because the defendant/mother lied about birth control,
would directly impact the financial well-being of the innocent child being cared for by the
mother, as the father's child support obligations were the primary item of economic damages
resulting from the fraudulently induced paternity, and any damages award would divest the
mother of funds necessary to care for the innocent child. Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
Public policy and the welfare of children mandate that fathers cannot maintain such claims
for damages. See, e.g., Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 684-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (noting
that the child's need for financial support is the prevailing public policy). When a child is
not involved, there is no superseding public policy reason for denying liability for
fraudulently induced sexual relations.
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as an inducement to have sexual relations. 83 A jury may have viewed the
facts pertaining to sexual inducement quite differently, but the judge
84
assured that no trial would ensue.
Utilizing similar analysis, the Maine Supreme Court held that the
defendant's failure to disclose an extramarital affair did not vitiate the
plaintiff-wife's consent to sexual relations with him. 85 The court held that
the husband's dishonesty in relation to an extramarital affair did not
constitute misrepresentation or mistake sufficient to vitiate consent to
sustain the intentional tort claim, but also noted that failure to disclose a
known disease could vitiate consent.8 6 This finding was related to the
court's conclusion that there is no duty to be sexually faithful in a marital
relationship-a view shared by a Washington court.8 7 Other courts have
dismissed claims for intentional torts grounded in fraudulently induced
88
sexual relations on a variety of similar bases.
83. Conley, 806 N.E.2d at 939. Regarding the negligence claim based on the argument
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of honesty based on the romantic nature of the
relationship, the court stated that no such duty exists. Id. at 936; see also Doe, 827 N.E.2d at
243-46 (stating that "[t]here are no comprehensive legal rules to regulate consensual sexual
behavior, and there are no commonly accepted customs or values that determine parameters
for the intensely private and widely diverse forms of such behavior"; concluding that no
general duty of care exists relative to sexual action during sex; applying a heightened
standard of recklessness to sexual action causing harm to another; and affirming summary
judgment for the defendant based on her alleged sudden change of position during
intercourse that caused the plaintiff to suffer a fractured penis requiring emergency medical
attention and long term pain).
84. Doe, 827 N.E.2d at 246.
85. McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1046-47 (Me. 1998). The parties waived
a jury trial and the court made findings of fact, including that the defendant ex-husband
transmitted HPV to his wife but was not aware of his HPV infection at the time of
transmission. Id. at 1044.
86. Id. at 1046. The court relied on section 892(A)(1) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to find that consent is ineffective if the person consenting is induced to consent by a
substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion. Id. The court found that, while
withholding information about a known disease could vitiate consent because it goes to the
nature of the touching, since here the defendant was unaware of his infection, consent was
not vitiated. Id. The court's cryptic analysis of fraud vitiating consent misses the point
entirely because the plaintiffs claim was that her consent was invalid not because of the
disease, but because of the deception concerning fidelity. See id. A trier of fact should have
been allowed to determine, based on all of the facts, whether the plaintiff would have
avoided contact with her husband but for the fraud, and if so, whether he should be liable
under battery law for misappropriating her sexual autonomy.
87. Id. at 1044. The court did however recognize a cause of action for negligent
infliction of a sexual disease. Id. at 1045; see also In re Marriage of J.T., 891 P.2d 729, 731
(Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there is no legal duty to be faithful in marriage).
88. In another case, a husband sued his wife on several bases, and one claim sought
money damages based on his allegation that prior to marriage, the wife had lied to him about
her relationship with her parents and where she grew up. The husband claimed that the lies
were intended to and did "induce [his] sympathy, affection and love and.., cause him to
marry" the defendant. R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 109-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(first alteration in original). The claim was dismissed because the allegations were
conclusory. Id. at 109. Yet, the court indicated that it was possible to state a claim for fraud
if the facts were specific enough and the plaintiff showed that he married the defendant in
reliance on her lies and was damaged thereby. Id. In a recent New York case, a wife failed
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Nevertheless, a few cases have recognized that fraud in the inducement
of sex may vitiate consent in the absence of physical injury, resulting in
battery. In one California case, the court found that the plaintiffs consent
to sexual relations was vitiated by the fact that the defendant failed to
disclose that he was infected with AIDS: "[T]he essence of the plaintiffs
grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted
and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any
physical harm done to his body .... ," 89 The plaintiff consented unaware of
the threat of AIDS, making the consent invalid, regardless of whether
was
physical injury ensued, because his sexual autonomy
90 Similarly, an Idaho court of appeals sustained a wife's
misappropriated.
claim for battery when she discovered her husband's concealment of an
adulterous affair, which she claimed negated her consent to sex based on
fraud in the inducement. 9 1 The court found a question of fact regarding the
"mistake concerning the nature of the contact or the harm to be expected
from it."' 92 The trial court had concluded that the wife's consent must be
that
measured at the time of the consent, but the court of appeals recognized
93
such an analysis would eviscerate the fraud exception to consent.

to tell her husband that her former husband had died of AIDS, which the husband claimed
misled him as to her HIV/AIDS status, and he sought damages under a fraud theory, inter
alia. See O'Neill v. O'Neill, 694 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (App. Div. 1999). The court noted that
the gist of the plaintiff's complaint was fear of contracting AIDS, which would be analyzed
as a toxic exposure case, which may explain its holding that his emotional injury due to fear
of contracting AIDS was not reasonable (both he and his wife tested negative for
HIV/AIDS) and that he could not recover for emotional distress resulting from deception in
the absence of pecuniary losses. Id. at 766-67; see also Tischler v. Dimenna, 609 N.Y.S.2d
1002 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (negligent infliction of emotional distress grounded in fear of
contracting a disease).
89. In re Louie, 213 B.R. 754, 762 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997) (alteration in original)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(finding that the plaintiff need not be aware of the offensive nature of the touching at the
time it occurs).
90. Id. at 764.
91. Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 877 (Idaho 1994).
92. Id.
93. The court stated,
The district court concluded that Thomas Neal's failure to disclose the fact of his
sexual relationship with [the mistress] did not vitiate Mary Neal's consent to
engage in sexual relations with him, such consent being measured at the time of
the relations. We do not agree with the district court's reasoning. To accept that
the consent, or lack thereof, must be measured by only those facts which are
known to the parties at the time of the alleged battery would effectively destroy
any exception for consent induced by fraud or deceit. Obviously if the fraud or
deceit were known at the time of the occurrence, the "consented to" act would
never occur.
Id. at 876-77. The court held that Mary Neal's affidavit at least raised a genuine issue of
material fact, and, quoting the affidavit, stated, "[I]f the undersigned had realized that her
husband was having sexual intercourse with counterdefendant LaGasse, the undersigned
would not have consented to sexual intercourse with counterdefendant Neal and to do so
would have been offensive." Id. at 877 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The conflict in the case law reflects the gray areas created by the
unfortunate reality that both men and women lie about various factual
aspects of their lives in order to obtain, or keep, sexual relationships. 94 The
emerging majority rule appears to be that sexual deception and

manipulation, no matter how outrageous, intentional, or malicious, are not
actionable unless the plaintiff suffers sexual disease or other physical
injury. This apparent emerging majority rule in sexual deceit cases fails to
95
protect personal choices regarding sexual contact.
The normative impact is that it is socially acceptable to manipulate
others' sexual choices through fraud, deceit, or a lack of common
decency. 96 Judges' views of these cases involving "only an ordinary
broken heart" 97 fail to recognize the very real, albeit intangible, injury that
often results from deceit in sexual relationships. The loss of an intimate
relationship can cause serious emotional and psychological distress, even in
the absence of disease. 98 Symptoms such as sleeplessness, panic attacks,
loss of appetite, and deep depression are not uncommon. 99

Betrayal in

intimate relationships can cause lifelong emotional scars and permanent
pain, including a lifelong inability to be intimate because of an inability to
trust.100 The emotional fallout from deception in the most intimate of
personal relations may have lasting consequences not just for the deceived
person, but for those emotionally attached to him who experience emotional
pain vicariously, such as spouses, children, siblings, and parents.
Intentional sex tort law should be reformed to more effectively protect
sexual autonomy and the emotional and other harm resulting from its

infringement.

94. Indeed, dishonesty in sexual relationships is apparently becoming more common. A
magazine survey revealed that only 50% of survey respondents felt that people should be
able to sue for emotional distress when a sexual partner lies to them, and 67% said they
would not sue for sexual fraud even if they could because, e.g., "[p]eople have to learn that
the world isn't a nice-nice place and you can't legislate it into one." Subotnick, supra note
45, at 393 n.449 (quoting Should the Law Punish Lovers Who Lie? 84% Say Yes, GLAMOUR,
June 1994, at 133) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 802-03. In Conley v. Romeri, the plaintiff
alleged pecuniary losses in the form of business losses resulting from her depression, but the
court found these to be insufficient. See 806 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
96. Susan Estrich believes that rape should be defined to include coercion by false
statements as well as coercion by physical force. See Estrich, supra note 41, at 1120 ("[We
should] prohibit fraud to secure sex to the same extent we prohibit fraud to secure
money. ... "). Jane E. Larson has proposed that the lack of remedies for sexual fraud and

deception may lead to increased unfair dealings between sexual partners, such as Lorena
Bobbitt's self-help remedy, and advocates a return to tort actions to provide a remedy for
persons sexually defrauded. See Larson, supra note 20, at 422-24.
97. Conley, 806 N.E.2d at 938 n.5.
98. See generally JANIS ABRAHMS SPRING, AFTER THE AFFAIR: HEALING THE PAIN AND
REBUILDING TRUST WHEN A PARTNER HAS BEEN UNFAITHFUL (1996) (discussing emotional
pain and healing after a partner's affair).
99. See, e.g., Subotnik, supra note 45, at 313 (noting typical symptoms resulting from
disappointments in personal relationships).
100. See Larson, supra note 20, at 426.
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III. TOWARD A UNIFIED INTENTIONAL SEX TORT ANALYSIS

To put it plainly, a man may do things to get a woman's agreement to sex
that would be illegal were he to take her money in the same way. .... By
protecting consent in sexual relations less vigorously than in commercial
relations, existing law embodies a hierarchy of values that either ranks
sexual integrity unjustifiably low or the integrity of market transactions
unjustifiably high. ' 0 '
Cases

of sexual

autonomy

misappropriation

should be

protected

consistent with other types of intentional torts.

Intentional tort doctrine
protects a person's right of self-determination relative to his person and
property. 10 2 Proof of damages is generally not necessary, 10 3 because the
injury is intangible, consisting of interference with the plaintiff's autonomy,
which constitutes harm as a matter of law. 10 4 The plaintiffs prerogatives
are unencumbered by any "reasonableness" analysis provided that they are
clearly communicated or otherwise understood by the defendant. 10 5 While

101. Id. at 412-13; see also Bender, supra note 18, at 148-50 (arguing that tort law
values physical security and property more highly than emotional security, which burdens
women, who are more likely to assert emotional claims).
102. "[T]he plaintiffs right of self-determination or autonomy [is] the centerpiece of the
law on intentional torts .... " DOBBS, supra note 2, at 217; see also id. at 47, 54. Battery
protects the right to avoid harmful or offensive bodily contact; assault protects the right to
avoid apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive bodily contact; false imprisonment
protects the right to personal freedom of movement; trespass to land protects the right of
autonomy regarding one's premises; and trespass to chattels and conversion protect the right
of autonomy regarding one's personal property. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT
LAW INAMERICA (2003).

103. The exceptions are conversion and trespass to chattels (damages or lost use must be
proven), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (proof of extreme emotional distress
satisfies the harm element). See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 122-27, 150-53, 824-26. Of
course, if one partner incurs financial losses resulting from deceit, such as economic losses
incurred in paying housing costs of a deceptive partner, those losses would be recoverable as
special damages. See id. at 79-80 (discussing damages that may be recovered in intentional
tort cases).
104. There is an enormous difference in the degree of protection afforded to the
plaintiffs autonomy under intentional tort theories and other theories protecting autonomy.
Whereas the constitutional right of privacy involves a balance of the interest infringed and
the state's interest in the infringement, and the dignitary tort invasion of privacy involves a
fact-finder's review of whether the invasion was reasonable, the intentional torts fiercely
protect the individual's autonomy without reference to the reasonableness of his choice or
the other party's interest in invading his choice. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,
563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the plaintiffs' refusal to allow a neighbor to
access his property by traveling over the plaintiffs' property was within the plaintiffs'
unfettered discretion, such that ignoring the plaintiffs' decision constitutes trespass; and
affirming an award of $100,000 in punitive damages, since the defendant had actual notice
of the plaintiffs' decision not to allow the use of their property).
105. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, at 54 ("Battery today vindicates the plaintiffs right
of autonomy and self-determination, her right to decide for herself how her body will be
treated by others, and to exclude their invasions as a matter of personal preference, whether
physical harm is done or not."). In some circumstances, what a defendant "understood" may
be determined objectively, based on ordinary social usages. See infra Part II.B, C.2; see
also, e.g., Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329 (111.App. Ct. 1995) (holding that a hospital's
knowledge of a plaintiffs demand not to be seen naked or touched by a male rendered the
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there are a few exceptions to automatic liability for infringing another's
personal autonomy, 10 6 a person may be liable for an intentional tort even if
she does not intend to hurt the plaintiff in any way, or even believes she is
07
benefiting him.1
Choices regarding sexuality are, a priori, among the most private and

protected aspects of a person's autonomy and implicate the person's bodily
integrity and psychological and spiritual well-being. In nonsexual contexts,
personal autonomy is fiercely protected, even relative to consent to sexual
touching induced by fraud.10 8 An intentional tort action should lie when
the facts sufficiently prove that one romantic partner misappropriated
10 9
another's sexual autonomy.
A. PersonalAutonomy Infringement: The Law of Battery

Battery is the best intentional tort theory for cases of sexual choice
misappropriation.' 10 Battery protects the individual's unfettered choice to
determine who touches his body and recognizes the importance of the core
American values of freedom and self-actualization. 1 ' Iits elements are
hospital liable for male nurse's treatment of the plaintiff). But see

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 19 caveat (2000) ("The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether the actor is
liable [for offensive contact] if he inflicts upon another a contact which he knows will be
offensive to another's known but abnormally acute sense of personal dignity.").
106. As with most legal matters, there are a few exceptions. For example, a person's
choice not to be shoved by another may be superseded by the defendant's privilege to touch
another without consent in defense of others. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 168-69. Thus, a
person who is shoved out of the way by a rescuer in order to save a drowning child would
not have a remedy against the rescuer in recognition that physical contact without consent
may be legally justified when necessary to save another person's life.
107. DOBBS, supranote 2, at 54. For example, the defendant must not perform a cesarean
section despite the fact that it would improve the fetus's chance of survival and despite the
fact that most people would welcome such medical intervention to benefit their fetus, if the
pregnant plaintiff refuses such treatment. See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994); see also Rodriquez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Gragg v.
Calandra, 696 N.E.2d 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp.,
614 N.E.2d 841 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), rev'don other grounds, 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996);
cf Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.2d 638, 640-41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that the
defendant may be liable for battery even though seeking the plaintiffs own good).
108. See infra Part III.C.1.
109. What constitutes "sex" may be an issue of fact. Whether the alleged sexual acts are
sufficiently invasive of autonomy based on sufficiently material misrepresentations should
be left to a jury.
110. When a sexual disease is knowingly transmitted, strict liability is the superior theory.
See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 824. Fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are recognized sex torts where the plaintiff suffers a sexually transmitted disease,
and a few courts have indicated a willingness to recognize an intentional tort theory in the
absence of sexual disease transmission. See supra Part II.
111. Physical self-determination is necessary to intellectual self-determination, as it is
impossible to "think as you will and to speak as you think," where your ability to control
your body and health are compromised by another's deception. Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (discussing policy for First Amendment protection of speech and
concept that people develop most fully in the context of open discourse, not censored
information). See also Olmstead v. United States, where Justice Louis Brandeis made the
following observation in dissent about the Framers' intent in drafting the Constitution:
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amenable to proof in the context of sexual deceit by reference to existing
battery doctrine defining "offensive" contact and "consent.""12 Dignitary
3
harm is presumed to flow from interference with bodily autonomy,"1
because the right of bodily autonomy is considered integral to selfdetermination and therefore fiercely protected. 1 14 Compensatory damages
for battery are most comprehensive and include general damages for
emotional distress and mental suffering such as fear, anxiety, indignity, or
15
disgrace, in addition to economic losses. 1
[The Framers] undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness.... They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred ...the right to be let alonethe most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). Tort law is the primary means of vindicating privacy and selfdetermination in the absence of state action, and intentional tort policy is grounded in the
right to be left alone.
112. Although fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress are viable sex tort
vehicles in certain circumstances of sexual misconduct, most sets of facts that would support
these claims also support a claim for battery, making these other claims generally less
efficient and superfluous. Fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress require proof
of intent that is more difficult to establish than proof of intent for battery purposes. For
example, intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of intent to cause
emotional distress or reckless disregard for the other's emotional distress, whereas intent to
offend may be established by reference to community norms and can be based on substantial
certainty. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, at 56, 826; infra Part III.C.2. Fraud also requires a
showing of actual intent to deceive, which is a higher intent burden. Both fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress also require proof of harm, which should not be
required in cases of sexual choice manipulation, because injury is presumed to flow from
autonomy infringement. While harm is presumed, parasitic damages for emotional distress,
pecuniary loss, and any other losses flowing from the tort's commission are recoverable.
Thus, claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress are unnecessary to
recover any item of damages and are less efficient because they require proof of more
elements and create more issues for the trier of fact.
113. The value of bodily autonomy dates back to the old common-law writ of trespass
and is entrenched in tort and constitutional law. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 54. Selfdetermination and autonomy are protected from state interference by the Due Process
Clause, which includes the "right to die" as part of self-determination regarding one's
physical body. See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
(holding that the constitutional right of liberty protects an individual's right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, refusal of which results in death). Self-determination regarding
one's body is protected against private interference by tort law, primarily battery (protecting
the right not to be touched harmfully or offensively) and false imprisonment (protecting the
right to move about freely).
114. For example, the traditional informed consent standard (the medical standard of
disclosure, set by the custom of practitioners) has been challenged in recent decades in favor
of a standard more concerned with the patient's right of self-determination. Thus, some
recent decisions favor a duty to disclose all information that the patient would want to
consider before consenting to a medical procedure because "[riespect for the patient's right
of self-determination... demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves." DOBBS, supra note 2, at 655-56
(alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784
(D.C. Cir. 1972)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) (battery law
encompasses more than direct contact to the body in recognition of the autonomy and
dignity infringed when an object intimately connected to the body is disturbed).
115. See Whitley v. Andersen, 551 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a
student who shoved another student near her school locker was liable for battery despite no
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The plaintiffs right of autonomy even includes a zone around the
plaintiff's actual physical body:"1 6 "Since the essence of the plaintiff's
grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted
and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person and not in any
physical harm done to his body, it is not necessary that the plaintiffs actual
body be disturbed."' 17 Thus, grabbing another's plate, or hat, or garment,
or even blowing smoke into another's face, may be actionable."18 The
plaintiff need not know that the contact is offensive at the time of the
contact, because liability is based on the defendant's
intentional invasion of [the plaintiffs] dignitary interest in the
inviolability of his person and the affront to [his] dignity ....
This affront
is as keenly felt by one who only knows after the event that an indignity

physical injury); see also Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529
(D.D.C. 1981) ("To constitute the tort of battery, a defendant can be found liable for any
physical contact with the plaintiff which is offensive or insulting, as well as physically
harmful."). As explained by one court,
The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent,
or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will
invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids. The defendant may
be liable although intending nothing more than a good-natured practical joke, or
honestly believing that the act would not injure the plaintiff, or even though
seeking the plaintiffs own good.
Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.2d 638, 640-41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (citing W. PAGE KEETON,
DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 8, at

36-37 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]) (holding that, where a coworker

intended to "tap" the back of the plaintiff's knee with the front of his knee from behind,
apparently as a joke, but the plaintiff fell and sustained harm, the lack of foreseeability of
harm is not relevant in intentional tort action); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
13 cmt. c. Of course, if physical injury occurs, a battery action lies even where the
defendant intended no harm and could not reasonably foresee that harm could occur, but
intended to touch the plaintiff. See, e.g., Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987)
(involving an employer who touched an employee with an automobile condenser during
horseplay, intending only mild shock, but caused serious nerve injury requiring surgery); see
also PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 9, at 40 ("The defendant's liability.., extends, as in most
other cases of intentional torts, to consequences which the defendant did not intend, and
could not reasonably have foreseen, upon the obvious basis that it is better for unexpected
losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer than upon the innocent victim.").
116. This is usually referred to as the "extended personality" rule. See DOBBS, supra note
2, at 61-62.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c. "There are some things such as
clothing or a cane or, indeed, anything directly grasped by the hand which are so intimately
connected with one's body as to be universally regarded as part of the person." Id.
118. See, e.g., Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Commc'ns, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a talk show guest's blowing cigar smoke into a known antismoking
advocate's face during a radio talk show may constitute harmful or offensive contact
grounded in smoke particles or "particulate matter" touching the plaintiff's body); Fisher v.
Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (asserting that the extended
personality rule holds that offensive contact with an object that is intimately connected to the
plaintiffs body constitutes "contact" with the plaintiffs body, when a hotel agent snatched
the plaintiffs plate from him in offensive manner and refused to serve him because he was a
"negro").
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has been perpetrated upon him as by one who is conscious of it while it is
being perpetrated. 119

Two elements must be proven to establish a claim for battery: intent to
cause a harmful or offensive contact, 12 0 and a resulting harmful or offensive
contact. 12 1 In sexual choice misappropriation cases, the defendant usually
does not intend to "harm" the plaintiffs body, but rather seeks sexual
gratification to the detriment of the plaintiffs fairly informed decision.
These cases therefore require a showing of intent to "offend."1 22 Consent is
the usual defense, since the plaintiff usually consented at the time of sex but
later learned facts that arguably vitiate consent post facto, making the
contact "offensive" to the plaintiff in light of after-acquired facts. Analysis
of the meaning of "intent to offend" and when consent is vitiated by fraud
(particularly relative to after-acquired facts) is necessary to decide most
cases of battery based on fraud in the inducement of sex.
B. The Meaning of Intent to Offend
Existing authority provides two separate bases for finding conduct to be
"offensive," which are referred to herein as actual and constructive intent to
offend. First, if the plaintiff clearly manifests a subjective desire to avoid
the defendant's contact for any reason, 123 the defendant's contact thereafter
is per se offensive because choices regarding who touches one's body are
unfettered and are not subject to review based on reasonableness or sexual
expectations. 124 Thus, if a person actually expresses his sexual preference
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. d.

120. Where no injury (such as sexual disease) is involved, the contact is not "harmful," so
the key is whether it was "offensive." Since sexual relations involves bodily contact, there is
no issue about contact per se. See id. § 18 cmt. c.
121. Id. §§ 13, 18.
122. The meaning of intent for intentional tort purposes is merely the "intent to bring
about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 115, at 36. Intent to cause offensive contact may be shown
by substantial certainty. If it is apparent that the plaintiff is not consenting to the defendant's
contact, the defendant's intent in touching her is considered offensive. DOBBS, supra note 2,
at 56.
123. Anything that infringes the plaintiffs reasonable sense of personal dignity, that is,
his "actual and apparent wishes to avoid," is actionable in a battery case. DOBBS, supra note
2, at 55.
124. There are minor exceptions relating to a plaintiffs subjective feelings about the
contact which do not apply in the sexual relations context, such as that a person normally
cannot sue another for tapping him on the shoulder to request the time of day. See DOBBS,
supra note 2, at 56. Sexual decisions are not amenable to presumed acceptance pursuant to
ordinary "social usages" analysis any more than medical choices, because invasion of sexual
and medical choices impact a person's subjective moral and religious views and selfdetermination on a deep level, unlike getting tapped on the shoulder or being jostled in a
crowd. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (2000); see also Cohen v. Smith,

648 N.E.2d 329, 335-36 (11. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that, since the plaintiff specifically
demanded not to be seen or touched while naked by any male, whether the hospital was
liable for battery based on its disregard of the plaintiffs wishes and its having allowed a
male nurse to see and touch the plaintiff while she was naked, presented a jury question on
the issue of intent to offend).
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to the defendant, or the preference is otherwise actually known to the
defendant, and such preference is disregarded by the defendant in order to
obtain consent to sex, the defendant will be held to have intended offensive
contact because she has knowingly undermined the plaintiffs right of
sexual autonomy. 125 Similarly, if the defendant obtains consent with actual
knowledge of the plaintiffs incapacity to consent, she should be held to
have intended offensive contact based on her knowledge of a lack of true
consent. 126 This is actual intent to offend.
Second, the Restatement's concept of "offensive" contact includes
contact that violates social usages that are "prevalent" at the time and place
of the contact. 127 That is, offensive contact may be established by social
standards that bind the defendant constructively, regardless of her actual
intent to offend. Some common and minor touchings may be presumed
acceptable based on "social usages," such as tapping another on the
shoulder, touching another's sleeve, brushing past another in a crowded

125. As stated by Professor Dan Dobbs, "Battery today vindicates the plaintiffs rights of
autonomy and self-determination, her right to decide for herself how her body will be treated
by others, and to exclude their invasions as a matter of personal preference, whether physical
harm is done or not." DOBBS, supra note 2, at 54.
126. See, e.g., Reavis v. Solminski, 551 N.W.2d 528, 540 (Neb. 1996) (stating that the
plaintiff's "abnormal inability to refuse unwanted sexual contact" as a result of childhood
sexual abuse could render consent invalid if the defendant had actual knowledge of such
incapacity); Bunce v. Parkside Lodge of Columbus, 596 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991) (finding that a patient experiencing drug withdrawals in a drug rehabilitation center
may not have given valid consent to sex with her counselor, who knew of her addiction and
diminished capacity).
127. The Restatement characterizes the state of the law as follows:
In order that a contact be offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity, it
must be one which would offend the ordinary person and as such one not unduly
sensitive as to his personal dignity. It must, therefore, be a contact which is
unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is
inflicted.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a; see also DOBBS, supra note 2, at 53 ("Any
touching that violates ordinary social usages may thus be a battery unless the plaintiff has
given signs that it is acceptable."). The element of intent to offend may turn on a
community standard insofar as the defendant is bound by community standards about what
is reasonable and in accordance with social norms. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 56. Thus,
for example, if ordinary social usages require the defendant to disclose that she is two
months pregnant with another man's child before initiating sexual relations with the
plaintiff, she has "intended" to offend the plaintiff whether or not she was actually aware
that a social expectation of candor in this regard exists. Constructive notice is a concept that
appears throughout our legal system and is based on the expectation that people in a society
know or should know certain information in order to conform to legal requisites; it is no
excuse if they are subjectively unaware of information of which they should be aware.
Objective reasonableness, including constructive notice, is the cornerstone of negligence
law. Since the Restatement defines "offensive" conduct by reference to objective, prevailing
social usages, the defendant is bound by such even if she was unaware of the social usages
or incorrectly subjectively believed that her conduct comported with social usages. A jury is
the proper body to decide what constitutes "prevailing social usages," since a jury represents
society at large.

1078

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

subway, or shaking hands upon introduction. 128
This reflects a
commonsense approach to inevitable contact in a crowded society.
However, if the defendant perpetrates physical contact that exceeds the
bounds of ordinary social usages and violates social norms, she will be held
129
to have done so with constructive intent to offend.
The concept of constructive intent to offend is consistent with other
intentional tort law doctrine. For example, misappropriation for purposes
of a conversion claim is established upon proof that the defendant exercised
control over a chattel owned or possessed by the plaintiff inconsistent with
the plaintiffs property rights, even if the defendant is unaware that her
actions violated the plaintiffs rights: "[T]he focus of inquiry is not on the
defendant's conduct but on the plaintiffs property rights."' 130 No proof of
"wrongful" intent is required; the defendant may even be operating under a
mistaken belief that she owned the property. 13 1 This is the same type of
minimal intent required for trespass to land: a simple, perhaps innocent,
intent to enter land owned by the plaintiff establishes a case because the
plaintiffs property rights have been violated, whether or not the defendant
intended any violation. 132 These rules place an onus on all persons to
exercise care to avoid trampling on others' property rights, which translates

128. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a, illus. 1-4. Note that some
socially acceptable touchings could result in battery liability if the plaintiff has clarified his
desire to avoid the contact and the defendant ignores his decision. For example, if a person
obviously manifests his intent to avoid a handshake and another person nonetheless grabs his
hand, his right to control contact with his body has been disturbed, and his autonomy
infringed. Although the Restatement expresses no opinion regarding liability in these
circumstances (where the actor knows his contact is offensive to another's known but
abnormally acute sense of personal dignity) and some touchings are not amenable to this
consent analysis because they are simply too ubiquitous and uncontrollable (e.g., brushing
past another in a crowded subway), the gist of battery law recognizes complete respect for
another's choice whether to be touched when that choice is clearly manifested, whether or
not it comports with societal expectations. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 54-55 ("[D]efendant
must respect the plaintiffs apparent wishes to avoid intentional bodily contact....
[P]laintiff s right to avoid unwanted intentional contact does not depend upon.., the
reasonableness of the plaintiffs wishes .... [I]t depends upon violating the plaintiffs right
to herself.").
129. For example, in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993), the defendant's
intent to perpetrate offensive sexual contact by videotaping his girlfriend during sex without
her knowledge could be demonstrated by community standards and expectations of privacy
during sexual acts, regardless of his subjective intent to harm or offend her, assuming the
plaintiff would not have consented to the sexual contact had she understood the risks at hand
resulting from the videotaping (such as the later dissemination of the tape to third parties).
Thus, although Boyles's actual intent may have been to amuse himself and his friends, and
not to harm Kerr, he would be held to a standard of constructive intent to offend if his
"hidden camera" escapade fell below minimal civil expectations under the circumstances,
i.e., violated prevailing "social usages." Similarly, failure to disclose an extramarital affair
in obtaining consent to sex with a spouse could vitiate consent if, but for the omission, the
other spouse would not have consented, and if the omission violates social expectations of
candor in marital relations. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 876-77 (Idaho 1994).
130. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 127.
131. Id.at 128-29.
132. Id.at 129.
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into a due diligence duty to determine ownership, because ignorance is no
defense. Constructive notice is sufficient to warrant liability for a variety of
133
intentional torts.
Surely a person's right of bodily and sexual autonomy deserves the same
type of protection against others' infringement. Providing such legal
protection validates the Restatement's conception of "offensive" conduct:
bodily autonomy must be respected, and it is infringed when the defendant
fails to abide by minimal social standards of respect for others, regardless
of whether the defendant subjectively intended to offend the plaintiff or
interfere with his autonomy. 134 Constructive intent to offend has already
been applied in romantic touching battery cases: a well-intentioned kiss is
actionable in the absence of the plaintiffs consent because it exceeds what
is presumably allowed without consent in our society. 135
The
Restatement's conception of constructive intent to offend reflects a
reasonable approach to "offensiveness" grounded in social norms that
require consideration of others' personal prerogatives, and is an appropriate
way of proving intent in cases of sexual misappropriation.
C. Bases for InvalidatingConsent to Sexual Relations
Consent is a defense to battery, provided it was reasonably informed and
not induced by fraud. 136 Consent is vitiated by fraud if the plaintiffs
consent was made in reliance upon one or more untrue facts that were
material to the plaintiffs decision to consent, and the defendant was aware

133. For example, a person bound by a duty of care in keeping premises reasonably safe
does not get off the hook simply because she did not have actual notice of a dangerous
condition. The duty of care includes inspecting the premises for danger in a reasonable
manner. See, e.g., Thoma v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 649 So. 2d 277, 278-79
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that restaurant is liable for slippery floor despite lack of
actual knowledge of spill if restaurant employees caused the spill or failed to notice it and
clean it up within a reasonable amount of time); 62A AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 484
(2005).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (2000).

135. For examples of offensive conduct that could be actionable, see Wirig v. Kinney
Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn. 1990) (unwanted kissing and putting arm around
the plaintiff); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(unwanted kiss); Liljegren v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 227 S.W. 925, 927 (Mo. Ct. App.
1921) (kiss without consent). Kissing another without consent may even constitute the
crime of battery. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 490 S.E.2d 181, 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(upholding a defendant's jury conviction for criminal battery based upon "insulting and
provoking" kissing, despite his challenge that the court erred in allowing him to represent
himself at trial); see also Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1542-43 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(unwanted touching of breasts and licking). See generally Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d
681, 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (unwanted medical treatment); Gragg v. Calandra, 696
N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (same); Roberson v. Provident House, 576 So. 2d
992, 994 (La. 1991) (same); Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d
458, 461-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951) (right to refuse help for injuries).
136. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 217. There are other ways of vitiating consent, such as
abuse of power and incapacity, which are not relevant to this Article. See generally id. at
216-43 (discussing consent as a bar to recovery for battery).
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of the plaintiff s reliance on such material, untrue facts.137 Consent should
also be vitiated in the absence of actual fraud where the plaintiffs consent
was uninformed because he had no reason to know of the risks within the
defendant's knowledge that the defendant, despite constructive knowledge
that the risks would be material to the plaintiffs refusal to consent, failed to
disclose. This "uninformed consent" analysis adopts the Restatement's
constructive intent to offend analysis. These two bases for vitiating consent
are discussed separately below.
1. Fraud Vitiates Consent
For consent to be vitiated by fraud, a fact-finder must determine that the
plaintiff reasonably relied on one or more false facts that were material' 3 8
to his decision to consent. 139 In addition, the defendant must be guilty of
lying about, or concealing, the material facts in order to gain the plaintiffs
consent. 140 Thus, for example, if a person concealing material facts
receives consent to enter another's land, that consent is invalidated,
resulting in liability for trespass to land.1 41 In economic fraud cases
subsequent to the laissez-faire era of U.S. economics, materiality has been
broadly construed in favor of a plaintiffs autonomy in making economic
decisions based on a fair and adequate presentation of the facts relating to
142
the transaction.
137. Seeid. at231.
138. A Massachusetts court defined materiality as "whether 'a reasonable man would
attach importance [to the fact not disclosed] in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question."' McBimey v. Paine Furniture Co., No. 960031, 1999 WL 1411359,
at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Zimmerman v. Kent,
575 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991)). Fraud is usually proven by circumstantial
evidence. See Finesse Custom Homes, Inc. v. Jacks, No. 04-98-00607-CV, 1999 WL
511508, at *2 (Tex. App. July 21, 1999) (citing Spoijaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d
432, 435 (Tex. 1986)).
139. A jury must determine whether, under all of the circumstances involved in the case,
the information omitted or misrepresented (1) would have caused a reasonable person to
make a different decision (materiality) and (2) would have been believed and relied upon by
a reasonable person. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 115, at 750; see also China Family
P'ship v. S-K Group of Motels, Inc., 622 S.E.2d 40, 44-45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that
courts of equity require justifiable reliance-meaning that the plaintiff could not, by
reasonable diligence, have ascertained the truth-since to hold otherwise would encourage
culpable negligence); Rozen v. Greenberg, 886 A.2d 924, 929-30 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)
("[Firaudulent inducement 'means that one has been led by another's guile, surreptitiousness
or other form of deceit to enter into an agreement to his detriment."' (quoting Sec. Constr.
Co. v. Maietta, 334 A.2d 133, 136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975))).
140. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(c)(3) (West 1997) ("'Fraud' means an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal
rights or otherwise causing injury.").
141. Copeland v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 402, 404-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
142. See Larson, supra note 20, at 412-13 nn.169-71; see also, e.g., Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). Most states have created state acts modeled
after these acts, and many provide for treble damages and attorneys' fees upon successfully
demonstrating consumer fraud, which may include failure to disclose material facts
regarding products, resulting in economic loss to the consumer. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & CoM.
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Fraud and exceeding the scope of consent related to physical risks have
been held to vitiate consent in battery cases. 14 3 For example, failing to
inform another that brass knuckles would be used during a fight vitiates
consent to the fight because the consent was grounded in a mistaken
understanding about the degree of risk. 144 In the sexual context, failure to
disclose physical risks can vitiate consent. A number of cases have held
that where the plaintiff mistakenly believes the defendant to be infertile or
free of sexual disease, and the defendant knows of the plaintiffs mistaken
belief and does not correct it, consent is vitiated, resulting in liability for
45
battery. 1
In certain types of intentional sex tort cases involving dignitary and
emotional risks only, fraudulently induced consent has been held to vitiate
consent. For example, if a medical professional represents that she is
touching the plaintiff's genital area for medical purposes when in fact she is
seeking sexual gratification, the plaintiff s consent to the physical contact is
invalid.1 46 The idea apparently is that the plaintiff in such cases did not

CODE ANN. § 17 (Vernon 2002). Tort law purports to place human safety above property
interests. See, e.g., Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152, 159 (N.M. 1961) (holding that the use
of rifle causing injury to the leg of a boy who was engaged in a watermelon-stealing
escapade was excessive because "'the law has always placed a higher value upon human
safety than upon mere rights in property"' (emphasis omitted) (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 115 (4th ed. 1971))).

Yet, in reality tort law

protects economic interests over bodily integrity and emotional security.
143. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 115, at 114, 118-20.
144. Id. at 118 n.40.
145. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274, 277 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (herpes transmitted to the plaintiff); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (a lawyer induced sex with his client by telling her that he was infertile,
which was untrue, causing her ectopic pregnancy (where the fetus developed outside of the
uterus) and infertility); Hogan v. Tavzel, 660 So. 2d 350, 352-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that a failure to disclose the presence of genital warts may vitiate consent to sex); De
Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245, 246-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (defendant failed to disclose
that he had "crabs"). At least one court has held that, in the sexual context, consent can be
vitiated by substantial mistake regarding the nature of invasion, but only if the consent was
induced by fraud; that is, both parties were ignorant of the defendant's sexual disease, so
consent was valid because it was not induced by fraud. McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d
1043, 1046-47 (Me. 1998). Another court indicated that the defendant's intent could be
proven by substantial certainty, which could expand liability substantially, since persons
with no actual knowledge that they have a sexual disease could be held responsible for
passing it along if the fact-finder decides that they were "substantially certain" that they
could have a disease and failed to warn the plaintiff nonetheless. See Doe v. Johnson, 817 F.
Supp. 1382, 1396-97 (W.D. Mich. 1993). But note that contraceptive fraud is not actionable
to avoid child support obligations. See, e.g., C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 556 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 618-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)).
146. See Boyett v. State, 159 So. 2d 628, 630-31 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964) (noting that the
defendant was liable for battery by falsely representing that he was a medical doctor and
thereby obtaining consent to contact the plaintiff, because consent was vitiated by fraud);
Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 360, 367 (Cal. 1995)
(technician obtained consent to fondle nineteen-year-old pregnant woman by fraud regarding
the need to penetrate her); People v. Ogunmola, 238 Cal. Rptr. 300, 302 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that consent was vitiated where a patient who consented to a gynecological
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consent to sexual touching at all, but was fraudulently induced to consent to
what he believed was necessary medical treatment. 14 7 The fact remains
that, in these cases, when consent to sexual touching is induced by fraud
relating to the purpose of the touching, and the true purpose is the
defendant's sexual gratification, consent is vitiated by fraud in the
inducement with or without resulting physical injury. Yet, in the romantic
context, where the plaintiff is fraudulently induced to consent to sex, and
only dignitary and emotional risks are at stake, courts have frequently
reasoned that fraud does not vitiate consent as a matter of law due to a lack
of standards for materiality. 14 8 However, materiality is an issue properly
examination was in fact subjected to a sex act); State v. Bolsinger, 709 N.W.2d 560, 562,
564-65 (Iowa 2006) (program supervisor of home for delinquent boys obtained consent to
sexual touching under pretense of checking for bruises, testicular cancer, etc.); McNair v.
State, 825 P.2d 571, 575 (Nev. 1992) (holding that a physician's penile penetration of a
patient under guise of performing medical examination constituted sexual assault, because
consent was induced by fraud and deceit, rendering it invalid); Bartell v. State, 82 N.W. 142,
143 (Wis. 1900) (defendant obtained consent to "massage" naked eighteen-year-old under
false pretenses).
147. Some courts distinguish "fraud in the factum," which refers to fraud as to the nature
of a legal instrument, from "fraud in the inducement," which refers to a misrepresentation
that leads another into a transaction by giving a false impression as to the risks, duties, or
obligations involved. See Suliveres v. Commonwealth, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1090-91 (Mass.
2007). In the sexual context, fraud in the factum has been applied where a doctor obtained
consent to penetrate a victim with a medical instrument, then penetrated her with his penis.
See, e.g., Boro v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
Generally, however, sexual fraud cases are based on fraud in the inducement of sexual
touching, because the fraud relates to inducement of consent, as opposed to the nature of the
contact. Bolsinger, 709 N.W.2d at 564; Suliveres, 865 N.E.2d at 1090-91.
148. See supra Part II; see also, e.g., Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 939 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2004). The Conley court held as a matter of law that a defendant boyfriend's lies about
his ability to have more children, knowing that the plaintiff wanted children, could be seen
only as "an inducement to continue dating," not inducement to sexual intercourse, and
therefore, the fact of his vasectomy did not vitiate consent to sex as a matter of law, despite
the plaintiffs claim that her biological clock was ticking at age forty and she intended to
date only men who wanted and could have children. Conley, 806 N.E.2d at 939; see also
C.A.M., 568 A.2d at 557-58. In C.A.M. v. R.A.W., the court dismissed a variety of tort
claims against a man who told a woman that he was unmarried and had had a vasectomy
because his misrepresentations resulted in a normal, healthy baby. The court did not discuss
the right of autonomy and battery law specifically, but, as a policy determination grounded
in privacy, it noted that courts should not regulate "promises made between two consenting
adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct." C.A.M., 568 A.2d at 557-58.
However, the dissent argued that other cases have found that consent to sex can be vitiated
by fraud and argued that the delicate issues presented in the case, although difficult, should
not be dismissed without giving the plaintiff a full opportunity to prove her case. Id. at 56365 (Stem, J., dissenting). But see, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 877 (Idaho 1994)
(holding that a husband's failure to disclose the fact of his sexual relationship with a woman
other than his wife could vitiate consent, and, therefore, the trial court erred in holding that it
did not vitiate consent as a matter of law); DOBBS, supra note 2, at 232; see also Piggott v.
Miller, 557 S.W.2d 692, 694-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that, where the plaintiff
agreed to sexual relations in reliance on the defendant's assertion that he intended to marry
her, the defendant's misrepresentation vitiated her consent, resulting in a claim of battery);
Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Wis. 1974) (holding that misrepresentations regarding
marital status supported a claim of seduction, and misrepresentations regarding the purpose
of injections and manipulation by a defendant-doctor supported a claim of battery).
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decided by a jury or other fact-finder, and standards 14for
materiality are
9
readily available by reference to existing fraud case law.
Materiality requires that the false statement upon which the plaintiff
relied (1) relates to a past or present fact, (2) relates to a material aspect of
the agreement, as opposed to a collateral aspect, (3) is not mere "puffing,"
and (4) is not a mere prediction of future events over which the defendant
lacks control. 150 Thus, statements not amenable to factual proof, such as "I
love you" or "you are the one for me" are akin to puffing or prediction, and
51
should not establish fraud in the inducement of sex as a matter of law.'
However, there are other types of statements that are amenable to factual
proof, such as marital status, or whether the defendant is currently sexually
involved with other persons. 152 Misrepresentations regarding such factual
matters create a relatively simple jury question regarding materiality and
validity of consent.
Factual issues involved in fraudulently induced sex cases in the romantic
context are no more difficult to decide than factual issues in other types of
fraud cases where a jury must determine whether, under all of the
circumstances, the allegedly fraudulent statement was factual, or whether it
was mere puffing, prediction, or opinion.' 53 Whether the plaintiff
justifiably relied, i.e., whether he somehow was on notice of the

149. See, e.g., Neal, 873 P.2d at 877 (holding that whether a husband's affair was
material enough to vitiate consent to sex is a question of fact); Star Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre &
Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2002) (stating that materiality is ordinarily a
question of fact). The materiality component of the tort is rooted in the element of
justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. See Rozen v. Greenberg, 886 A.2d 924, 930
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) ("Materiality of
Misrepresentation (1) Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable unless
the matter misrepresented is material. (2) The matter is material if (a) a reasonable man
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action
in the transaction in question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining
his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it."); see also Kmiec,
supra note 70, at 1444, 1451 (discussing generally the problem of "judicial activism" and the
concept that judges improperly self-allocate power properly left to others, thereby "misusing
authbrity").
150. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 1363-70.
151. There is always the possibility that a promise about the future could be factual. If,
for an obvious example, the defendant told the plaintiff that he planned to marry her, and she
discovered that he had made the same statement to several other women on the same day,
this should suffice to prove that his statement was not mere opinion, but factually untrue.
See, e.g., Piggott,557 S.W.2d 692.
152. Misrepresentation regarding a sexual disease vitiates consent to sex. See supra note
145 and accompanying text. Similarly, in cases where the emotional risks are very different
from those represented, such as where the defendant is married and represents that she is
single, or where she fails to disclose unapparent health conditions such as the fact that she is
pregnant with another man's embryo, consent may be vitiated.
153. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Flo-Tronics, Inc., 143 N.W.2d 827 (Minn. 1966); Miller &
Sons, Inc. v. Earl, 502 N.W.2d 444 (Neb. 1993); Transport Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d
269 (Tex. 1995).
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misrepresentation but failed to heed such notice, is also a jury question. 154
The fraud/mistake exception to valid consent is often grounded in the
defendant's intentional misrepresentation of facts in order to gain consent,
but could also be based on the defendant's failure to disclose material facts
when it is evident that the plaintiff is unaware of such facts and is relying
55
on inaccurate factual assumptions.1
The defendant's intentional misrepresentations or omission of facts
157 relationship status, 158
regarding marital status, 156 extramarital affairs,
family background, 159 or other objective, material, factual aspects of her
life should vitiate consent in order to protect the plaintiffs sexual
autonomy, provided causation is established.' 60 The law should protect
personal choice in sexual matters consistent with the longstanding rule that
fraud vitiates consent and should leave case-by-case decisions to a finder of
fact, as in other types of intentional tort cases.

154. Generally, the plaintiff is allowed to rely on the defendant's material
misrepresentation without an investigation for purposes of transactional efficiency. See
DOBBS, supra note 2, at 1362. These cases are necessarily fact-intensive, making them
particularly appropriate for jury decision making.
155. See, for example, ALA. CODE § 6-5-102 (2005), where "suppression of material
facts" is defined as follows: "Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an
obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from
the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case." See
also McLellan v. Raines, No. 94115, 2006 WL 851394, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2006).
The McLellan v. Raines court held that, to establish fraud by silence, the plaintiff must show
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the defendant had knowledge of material facts that
the plaintiff did not have and that the plaintiff could not have discovered by the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (2) the defendant was under an obligation to disclose the fact; (3) the
defendant intentionally failed to disclose the fact; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the
defendant to disclose the material fact; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages as a result of
the defendant's failure to disclose the material fact. Id.
156. It is apparently fairly common for people to lie about marital status. In one
interview I conducted, a woman dated a man for a few months, then drove by his house and
saw a tricycle in his driveway. On their next date, she asked if he was married, and he said
"yes." She asked why he had not told her this, and his response was, "it never came up."
157. See Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871 (Idaho 1994).
158. For example, it would be a misrepresentation of relationship status to assure a sexual
partner that the relationship was sexually monogamous, then engage in sexual relations with
a third party without disclosing such to the original sexual partner. In this example, the
fraudulently concealed risks are both emotional and physical, but the misrepresentation
should be actionable with or without physical injury or the transmission of disease.
159. See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 109-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing a
husband's fraud claim based on his wife's misrepresentations about her relationship with her
parents and where she grew up because of pleading deficiencies). The court's opinion
appeared to support a fraud-based claim grounded in background misrepresentations upon
proper pleading and proof of causation. Id.
160. For example, a false statement that the defendant is a member of a certain religion
may not be material, unless the defendant knew that it was a significant factor in the
plaintiff's consent. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Duffher, 142 U.S. 43, 54-55 (1891) (stating that
a seller's false statement that he was a member of the Baptist Church probably not material).
The plaintiff still must prove causation, i.e., but for his reasonable reliance on the fraud, he
would not have consented to sex.
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2. Uninformed Consent
Consent may be rendered invalid retroactively because it was
"uninformed" at the time it was given. Informed consent requires informed
persons in trusting relationships to disclose all material information that
reasonably could impact another's consent to a transaction prior to closing
the transaction, or the consent is invalid. 16 1 This fiduciary-type disclosure
requirement is no novel concept in tort law and is manifested in many
forms, such as the requirement of disclosure of latent defects in real estate
sales and the requirement of warning labels on dangerous products. 162 The
tort duty to disclose information to another is based on the concept that a
person with superior knowledge or information should not abuse her
superior position to the detriment of another, or cause another to accept a
transaction that he would have rejected had she made fair factual disclosure.
In the context of battery law, informed consent has been applied only in
the medical context. 163
Informed consent requires that medical
professionals provide adequate information regarding risks that "a
reasonable patient would consider in deciding whether to undergo the
medical procedure."' 164 Although usually analyzed as medical malpractice
161. The matter is material if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence
or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 538(2)(a) (1977).

162. Although omissions of this type of information are labeled "fraud" and "products
liability information defect," respectively, the fundamental concept is the same: to make
sure that the buyer understands the risks involved in the transaction, so he can exercise his
personal choice in the matter based on reasonable disclosure of the facts.
163. Informed consent has been specifically upheld as a state law prerequisite to obtain
an abortion because of the importance of informed choice in matters of bodily autonomy,
including the impact the abortion choice has on a developing fetus. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-85 (1992). In addition, feminists have
argued for years that, in the context of rape, guilt should be established in the absence of
"affirmative consent," i.e., in the absence of "first obtaining explicit consent" from the rape
victim. See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATrHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN 23940 (2000); Subotnik, supra note 45, at 260-64; see also supra note 96.
164. Moure v. Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003, 1008 (Pa. 1992). See generally DOBBS, supra
note 2, at 652-63, for the law of informed consent. See also generally Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So. 2d 488 (Miss. 1987).
Informed consent means different things to different courts; some courts have recognized
battery claims grounded in lack of informed consent in the absence of medical negligence,
but claims based on lack of informed consent are treated as medical malpractice (negligence)
actions in most jurisdictions. See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 654; see also Rains v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 249, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (the plaintiffs stated battery claim based
on allegations that defendants misrepresented the therapeutic value of "sluggo therapy," a
violent form of psychiatric treatment); Espander v. Cramer, 903 P.2d 1171, 1172-73 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1995) (noting that Colorado law distinguishes between lack of consent giving rise
to battery, and lack of informed consent, which is a species of medical malpractice); Albany
Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 781 (Ga. 2000) (recognizing that a doctor's
lack of candor can result in a claim for battery grounded in uninformed consent); Colucci v.
Oppenheim, 740 A.2d 1101, 1109-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (holding that, where
surgery is authorized but consent is uninformed, negligence applies rather than battery, and
battery applies when a doctor did not obtain consent to operation at all or obtained consent to
a different kind of operation); Darrah v. Kite, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290 (App. Div. 1969)
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cases, a number of courts have recognized that, since the patient's right lies
in self-determination, whether information should have been disclosed
should turn on a legal test for materiality, not a medical negligence
standard. 165
The patient has the right to weigh his subjective,
individualized fears and values against the risks involved, so the personal,
not medical, question should be reserved to the patient alone. 16 6 What must
be disclosed for informed consent is therefore an issue to be determined by
a finder of fact, 167 using a reasonableness standard that includes the
defendant's knowledge of the plaintiffs particular fears, preferences, and
values. 168
A critical issue in informed consent jurisprudence is establishing a duty
to disclose adequate information prior to obtaining consent. The informed
consent rule has been applied to doctors and other medical professionals for
two reasons. First, a confidential, fiduciary relationship exists between a
doctor and a patient relative to invasive and potentially harmful physical
contact, giving rise to disclosure obligations.' 69 Second, a doctor has
superior access to medical information that a patient needs in order to make
an informed choice, but the patient's lack of experience or medical
(holding that uninformed consent or invalid consent is tantamount to no consent at all, and
that a surgeon who performs an operation without consent commits an assault); Nelson v.
Patrick, 293 S.E.2d 829, 832 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that where a medical procedure
is completely unauthorized, the claim sounds in assault and battery, and where consent is
uninformed, the claim sounds in negligence); Dean v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., No. 18636,
1999 WL 1260287, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1999) (holding that a surgery performed
without proper consent constitutes technical battery); Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798
A.2d 742, 749 (Pa. 2002) (holding that a claim that a physician failed to obtain the patient's
informed consent amounts to battery, not negligence).
165. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 656.

166. Id.
167. Even with the informed consent medical standard, there is an issue about what
precisely must be disclosed. Generally, the materiality standard is engaged, which requires
disclosure of all information that a reasonable patient would consider in deciding whether to
undergo the medical procedure. Id. at 658-59. Some states have statutory guidelines on
what must be disclosed for various medical procedures, which answers the question of what
must be disclosed. Id. If the doctor knows that a patient is concerned by some particular
matter, even if most people would not be, the doctor is under an obligation to disclose
information pertaining to that particular matter based upon his knowledge of the patient's
subjective concerns. Id. at 659.
168. See, e.g., Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329, 334-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). Although
most female hospital patients may not object to a male nurse touching them while naked, the
plaintiff in this case informed her doctor that her religion prohibited a male nurse from
touching her naked; here, the defendants' actual knowledge of the offensive nature of the
contact sustained a battery claim. Id.; see also DOBBS, supra note 2, at 660. The issue of
materiality relative to informed consent is a jury question generally. But see Albany Urology
Clinic, 528 S.E.2d at 778-80, where the court held as a matter of law, based in part on a
statute requiring certain types of disclosures prior to surgery, that doctors do not owe their
patients a duty to disclose "unspecified life factors" such as the doctor's illegal cocaine use,
and so omission of such information-which the patient claimed was material-cannot
provide a basis for fraud and cannot vitiate consent to surgery to support a battery claim.
The dissent in Albany Urology Clinic argued that, "[e]xcept in plain and palpable cases, the
issue of materiality must be submitted to the jury." Id. at 784 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
169. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 654-56.
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ignorance renders him unable to protect himself by asking all questions
relevant to his medical decision. 170 Fraud or mistake need not be shown in
order to vitiate consent because the plaintiff is entitled to rely on fair
interpersonal dealings
and candid disclosure to protect his right of self1
7

determination. 1

A similar expectation of candor requiring informed consent may be
appropriate between sexual partners considering the high emotional and
health risks involved in sexual intimacy and the public policy favoring
protection of sexual autonomy. 172 Whether a confidential relationship
exists should be a question of fact, depending on the circumstances
involved, such as the length and nature of the sexual relationship. 17 3 A
sexual decision may present a more compelling case for applying the
doctrine of informed consent than some medical decisions. In many
circumstances, medical intervention is necessary for proper health or
survival. Therefore, as a practical reality, a patient's decision may not be
impacted by a lack of full disclosure of all of the medical risks. That is, but
for the lack of disclosure, the patient probably would have made the same
medical decision based on medical necessity. The sexual decision, on the
other hand, is always entirely discretionary with no physical risks resulting
from refusal to consent: cause-in-fact is clearer in the sexual context.
What information must be disclosed in order for sexual consent to be
sufficiently informed should be a reasonable/materiality fact issue, based on
all of the evidence. Adopting this informed consent approach would create

170. Id.; see supra notes 164-65; see also Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1115-16
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (hospital failed to disclose FDA-required information to persons in a
clinical study). This case is well known for its holding that a hospital can be liable for
battery grounded in lack of informed consent where the court found as a factual matter that
the hospital had assumed a duty to obtain informed consent as part of its obligations under
FDA regulations when engaged in experimental treatment. Id. So far, courts have limited
Friter v. Iolab Corp. to its facts concerning a hospital's liability for lack of informed
consent, as it is generally just the doctors themselves, not the hospitals, that may be liable for
failing to provide informed consent prior to medical procedures. See also generally Stalsitz
v. Allentown Hosp., 814 A.2d 766 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N.
Tenn., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 804 (Tenn. 2000). Note also that some recent cases appear to be
using the term "informed consent" to refer to situations in which consent was never given.
DOBBS, supra note 2, at 243 n.6 (citing Fox v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 596 (Miss. 1992); Moure v.
Raeuchle, 604 A.2d 1003 (Pa. 1992)).
171. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 652-58.
172. Considering the level of personal security that may be compromised by sexual
activity, it is fair to hold sexual partners to a duty to disclose facts that are material to the
sexual decision. For a good standard for such a duty, see, for example, supra note 155 and
accompanying text.
173. At least in some states, whether a confidential relationship exists between the parties
is a question of fact for the jury or trial judge. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422,
432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Rieger v. Rich, 329 P.2d 770 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Wilson v. Sampson, 205 P.2d 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); In re Llewellyn's Estate, 189 P.2d
822 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)). Thus, for example, some jurors may feel that a one-night
stand does not create a confidential relationship, but a long-term monogamous relationship
does. Allowing the jury to decide this issue comports with a tort system grounded in social
expectations, i.e., a civil jury system.
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a convergent analysis between the prima facie element of intent to offend
grounded in social usages and the exception to consent based on a lack of
information: both are grounded in reasonable social expectations of candor
and respect for others' bodily autonomy. In addition, both place an onus on
the defendant to avoid misappropriating the plaintiffs right of selfdetermination, similar to the onus placed on defendants in other intentional
tort matters. 174 This proposed uninformed consent analysis is also
consistent with the consent counterpart in negligence law: consent that is
not adequately informed should not constitute a defense to battery any more
than assumption of the risk should bar a negligence claim when the party
is asserted voluntarily encounters the risk without
against whom the17defense
5
understanding it.
D. Making Sense of the ProposedDuty of DisclosureBased on the
Doctrine of Informed Consent
Informed consent analysis is necessary in intentional sex tort cases
because there are subtle forms 1 76 of sexual misappropriation that flout

174. See supra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
175. Assumption of the risk is the negligence counterpart to consent for intentional torts,
"except that [to] consent is to run the risk of unintended injury, to take a chance, rather than
to accept the greater certainty of intended harm [in the case of consent to an intentional
tort]." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 115, at 480-81. The test for whether the plaintiff
assumed the risk generally requires that the plaintiff have voluntarily consented to relieve
the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward her and to accept responsibility for injury
from a known risk. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal.
1963) (holding that assumption of the risk is not "voluntary" where a plaintiff was required
to execute a release in favor of the hospital in order to get treatment); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 115, at 480. Various courts have recognized that if the plaintiff is unaware of the
specific risks created by the defendant, she cannot truly voluntarily assume them and thereby
relieve the defendant of liability. See, e.g., Haugen v. Lazy K Enters., Inc., No. 15049-6-111,
1998 WL 123059, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1998) ("For implied primary assumption
of the risk to be found, the evidence must establish the plaintiff had full subjective
understanding of the presence and nature of the specific risk and voluntarily chose to accept
the risk." (citing Kirk v. Wash. State Univ., 746 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1987))). Generally
speaking, courts review the etiology of the harm to determine whether it was within the
contemplation of the plaintiff at the time she allegedly assumed the risk, i.e., was the harm
that occurred caused by a risk she agreed to accept, thereby relieving the defendant of
responsibility? Or, was the harm or injury caused by a risk that was outside of the scope of
those risks to which she consented? The cases often involve sporting events. For example, a
tennis player does not assume the risk of tripping over a torn net on a tennis court even if he
was aware of the torn net prior to playing tennis, as it is not a risk inherent in playing tennis.
Cf Werbelow v. State, No. 101194, 2005 WL 858064, at *2 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Mar. 14, 2005)
(holding that a rollerblader who fell on sidewalk crack that she had known was there and
attempted to avoid had assumed the risk); Haugen, 1998 WL 123059, at *4.
176. Some savvy courts are already recognizing that false impressions of fact can be
created in subtle ways and have incorporated such into their definition of "fraud." See, e.g.,
Nelson v. Gas Research Inst., 121 P.3d 340, 343 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) ("'[A] false
representation of a past or present fact is any words or conduct which create[] an untrue or
misleading impression of the actual past or present fact in the mind of another."' (first
alteration in original) (quoting Russell v. First Am. Mortgage Co., 565 P.2d 972, 975 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1977))).
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social expectations and convert plaintiffs' sexual choices, yet are not
amenable to the proof requirements for fraud or mistake to vitiate
consent. 177 The rules invalidating consent based on fraud or mistake place
the burden of proof on the plaintiff to establish the defendant's actual
knowledge that the plaintiffs consent was based on a factual mistake; there
is no such burden of proof under informed consent analysis. 178 Under the
Restatement, the plaintiff can prove the prima facie element of intent to
offend by reference to social usages in the absence of proving the
defendant's actual knowledge that her conduct was offensive to the
plaintiff. 179 The plaintiff's responsibility to demonstrate that consent was
invalid should not be greater than his burden of proof on the element of
intent to offend. Since social usages set the standard for expectations
regarding what contact is presumably "offensive" (to sustain the prima facie
intent element per the Restatement),180 the plaintiff should be allowed to
rely on social usages regarding reasonable expectations of disclosure to
meet his burden of proof that consent was not reasonably informed and
therefore invalid.
An example of two similar scenarios-where a claim for battery could lie
in one scenario in accordance with the rules invalidating consent based on
fraud or mistake (assuming material risks include dignitary and emotional
risks), but would be denied in the other similar scenario unless an informed
consent analysis were adopted-explains the need for an informed consent
analysis that adopts the Restatement's intent to offend analysis. Suppose a
married woman tells a man that she is single and will have a monogamous
sexual relationship with him if they become sexually involved, and he
177. Existing "fraudulent suppression" case law could be helpful in determining whether
nondisclosure, i.e., lack of informed consent, should vitiate consent. Consider, for example,
Alabama's general rule:
To establish a claim of fraudulent suppression, a plaintiff must prove by
substantial evidence that the defendant was under a duty to disclose an existing
fact of which it had knowledge; that it suppressed the fact by concealment or
nondisclosure; that the suppression induced the plaintiff to act or to refrain from
acting; and that the acting or refraining from acting resulted in damage to the
plaintiff.
Exparte Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 810 So. 2d 744, 748 (Ala. 2001).
178. Lack of information as a basis for vitiating consent is different from fraud or
mistake. Mistake means that the plaintiff gave consent while operating under mistaken
assumptions regarding the risks involved. Fraud means that the defendant deceived the
plaintiff about a material fact on which the plaintiff justifiably relied in giving consent. Lack
of information can vitiate consent when the plaintiff was neither defrauded nor mistaken, but
lacked information altogether about the nature of the risks, and only the defendant had
access to that information as a practical reality. For example, if a patient knows that an
operation has risks and also knows that she does not know what they are, she is not mistaken
about the risks, because her beliefs about them are not inconsistent with the true facts; rather,
she simply is uninformed. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 242. To the extent that the defendant did
not induce consent by fraud and the plaintiff is not mistaken about the essential nature of the
contact, the plaintiff cannot claim "mistake" to vitiate consent and must rely on the doctrine
of informed consent instead. Id. at 242-43.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (2000).

180. Id.
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agrees to a committed sexual relationship with her in reliance on her
assertions. Suppose further that his value system allows for unmarried
sexual relations in the context of a monogamous relationship, but not for
adultery.' 8 '
When he learns of her marriage, he suffers dignitary,
emotional, and spiritual harm, as well as lost wages and expenses for
psychological counseling. Since she is married, she should be liable for
battery based on her actual intent to misappropriate his sexual autonomy.
That is, she was aware that her marital status was material to his sexual
decision (or, presumably, she would not have lied about it) and induced his
consent by deceit. His consent could be vitiated by fraud if a fact-finder
determines that he reasonably and detrimentally relied on her false
statements and that they were material to his decision to consent to sex.
Now suppose that the woman simply does not wear a wedding ring and
does not actually tell the man that she is single. Assume all other facts are
the same, i.e., he believes that she is unmarried and would never knowingly
commit adultery. Now, assuming that failing to disclose marital status prior
to sex violates social usages, 182 her intent to offend can be established by
reference to social usages, whether or not she subjectively intended to
offend him. The prima facie case could be established under the
Restatement's constructive intent to offend analysis.' 8 3 However, the
defense of consent could not be vitiated under the fraud exception in the
absence of proof that she actually knew that his consent was materially
influenced by his mistaken belief that she was not married. That is, unless
he proves that she was actually aware of his mistake, he cannot establish
fraud to vitiate consent, despite establishing intent to offend based on social
expectations in the prima facie case. If informed consent analysis were
adopted, he may be able to establish that his consent was vitiated by her
failure to disclose marital status in a sexual relationship if such failure
violates prevailing social expectations (which may turn on length of
relationship, inter alia) and results in misappropriation of his sexual selfdetermination. The informed consent analysis would thus converge with
the Restatement's constructive intent to offend analysis.
One might argue that the burden should be on the plaintiff to ask all
questions to discover all material facts prior to consenting to sex. The
question really is: Who should bear the burden of making sure that sexual
consent is informed? Arguably, it could depend on the type of information
unknown to the plaintiff, i.e., whether it relates to a "patent" issue in sexual
relations, so that anyone reasonably could expect it to be an issue and make
181. Adultery is defined as "voluntary sexual intercourse between a married man and
someone other than his wife or between a married woman and someone other than her
husband." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 18.
182. See Jones, supra note 25, at 65 & nn.29-33. Although the media portray adultery
and sexual promiscuity as common behavior, the available research indicates that the
majority of Americans have very few sexual partners. See, e.g., Pollard, Sex Torts, supra
note 4, at 784 & nn.83-84. Whether behavior violates community standards is a jury
question to be decided in each case.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a.

2008]

INTENTIONAL SEX TORTS

1091

an inquiry, or whether it relates to a "latent" issue, i.e., one that a
reasonable person would not even think to inquire about, such that only the
defendant is in a position to assure informed consent. Recognizing a duty
to ask about marriage makes sense, because it is an obvious issue in sexual
relations for most people. However, there are latent conditions about which
the plaintiff may have no notice, such as the other's noncontagious terminal
disease or the other's early pregnancy that cannot be detected visually, both
of which may powerfully impact the plaintiff's decision whether to become
84
sexually involved.1
Informed consent analysis requires recognizing a duty by someone to
make sure that consent is informed. A consistent, clear duty rule is superior
to a case-by-case review for the same reasons that strict liability is superior
to negligence when one party has superior access to information about
risks. 18 5 From an economic standpoint, the duty should be imposed on the
person with actual knowledge. That is, liability should be placed on the
"cheapest cost avoider," which is the party who has easier, cheaper access
to the information needed to accurately calculate accident costs and
avoidance costs.18 6 The superior rule would place the burden of disclosing
material facts to a sexual transaction on the person who has actual
knowledge of such facts, 187 so that the other person can conduct his own
subjective cost-benefit analysis before consenting. This rule would require
each person to obtain informed consent for sexual relations or risk tort
liability. 1 88 This is consistent with the informed consent rule as applied to

184. The analysis should be consistent with the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977); see also id. § 540 ("The recipient of a fraudulent
misrepresentation of fact was justified in relying upon its truth, although he might have
ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation."). An exception
arises where, "under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to [a person with the
plaintiffs] knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has discovered
something which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived." PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 115, at 752 (citation omitted).
185. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at 804-10.
186. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). In the short run, administrative costs could increase as a
function of a greater number of claims filed resulting from the certainty of recovery. That is,
the universe of claims may be enlarged such that the overall administrative costs increase
despite lowered costs of each lawsuit resulting from streamlined legal analysis. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 209 (1973).
However, since liability will be more certain, settlements are facilitated, which are cheaper
than trials. Thus, any temporary increase in administrative costs resulting from more
lawsuits will be outweighed by expedited trials, more settlement, and, ultimately, more
responsible sexual behavior resulting from strict liability's deterrent effect.
187. This allows the jury to focus on what is material as opposed to who should have the
duty to disclose or inquire about the fact allegedly vitiating consent.
188. Perhaps more importantly, increasing the certainty of liability directly impacts
individual cost-benefit analysis by increasing the potential costs of irresponsible sexual
activity, which enhances the deterrent impact of law, ultimately reducing the number of
emotionally risky personal transactions. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supranote 4, at 812-19.
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doctors and properly places the burden of disclosure on the party with
superior knowledge of material facts that are unknown to the plaintiff.18 9
The truth is, most perpetrators of sexual autonomy misappropriation are
probably aware that they are not respecting their sexual partner's right of
unfettered sexual self-determination and are choosing deception to attract
partners who would otherwise reject them. 190 Perhaps the informed consent
analysis is best conceived as creating convergent analysis between the
Restatement's prima facie intent to offend analysis grounded in social
usages and a realistic analysis of whether the plaintiff truly consented in
situations in which fraud-vitiating consent cannot be established. In
addition to the benefit of creating convergent analysis between establishing
intent to offend and establishing the plaintiffs lack of true consent, there
are other fundamental tort principles that support the proposed informed
consent analysis. That is, even assuming that the defendant did not intend
to take advantage of the plaintiffs ignorance, imposing the cost of
uninformed consent on the defendant is still appropriate. The "paradigm of
reciprocity" holds that, as between two innocent parties, the person causing
harm should pay for it as opposed to the person who is harmed, particularly
where the risk created by the injurer is disproportionate to any risk created
by the victim. 19 1 In the sexual context, each partner is uniquely aware of
information about herself or himself that bears on the other's emotional
(and physical) risks; sometimes this information is not accessible through
any other source. The sexual battery paradigm proposed herein would
create a duty not just to avoid lying, but to disclose all facts that one could
reasonably expect that a sexual partner would want to know in order to
make a truly voluntary decision about whether to consent to sex. 192 Such
189. A doctor cannot defend failure to inform a patient of a material risk because the
doctor assumed the patient would know the risk, and also cannot blame the patient for failing
to ask. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. However, if for any reason the plaintiff
has actual notice of the facts the defendant allegedly failed to disclose, the plaintiff's claim
that consent was uninformed would be undermined.
190. These are likely the same "core" group of promiscuous people that are responsible
for the vast majority of disease transmission cases. See Pollard, Sex Torts, supra note 4, at
783-87; see also supra note 60.
191. See George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537,
543 (1972).
192. This proposed sexual battery tort paradigm grounded in "offensiveness" and
"consent" analysis is more comprehensive than similar proposals to protect sexual
autonomy, such as Larson's 1993 proposal. See Larson, supra note 20, at 453 ("I propose the
following addition to the Restatement (Second) of Torts: One who fraudulently makes a
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law, for the purpose of inducing another to
consent to sexual relations in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for
serious physical, pecuniary, and emotional loss caused to the recipient by his or her
justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation."). First, the paradigm proposed herein
strengthens the onus of disclosure regarding material facts on the person with superior
knowledge. Under this analysis, purpose to deceive need not be proven, and intent to
"offend," would be a jury question based on community standards. Under Larson's sexual
fraud paradigm, intent to deceive must be proven. Id. at 466 & n.3. Second, damages would
be presumed upon a showing of sexual battery, which vindicates the real harm-to the
plaintiff's autonomy-without necessitating proof of emotional distress or other damages, as
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an analysis could serve to encourage candid communications in romantic
relationships.
This could discourage miscommunication as well as
intentional deceit, in addition to protecting personal autonomy and avoiding
emotional injury and sexual disease transmission. The plaintiffs burden of
93
proving causation appropriately limits the universe of these claims.1
CONCLUSION

Intentional tort law's protection of personal autonomy should be
consistent, whether the risk is economic, physical, or emotional. The
current law's failure to protect sexual autonomy is not consistent with
prevailing sexual norms and undermines the law's consistency while
influencing norms contrary to public policy. Cases of sexual autonomy
infringement grounded in battery law should be left to a jury based on
social expectations, not dismissed as a matter of law. The importance of
sexual autonomy, and the very serious harms that can flow from
interference with it, justify adopting a civil sexual battery analysis
consistent with traditional battery law, fraud jurisprudence, and the doctrine
of informed consent, to allow a jury to determine each case based on
minimal social expectations of interpersonal civility.
Adopting the
analytical paradigm proposed herein will more fairly reflect American
sexual norms, enhance protection of sexual autonomy for all persons, and
encourage candid and healthy interpersonal relations consistent with public
policy.

required by Larson's proposal. Id. at 461. The reality is that the plaintiff would have little
incentive to file a claim for sexual battery unless he was very emotionally distressed. The
plaintiff should have the choice whether to seek damages for emotional distress (which
opens up discovery regarding his emotional past) or to seek a remedy for loss of sexual
autonomy, and punitive damages in an appropriately egregious case. This proposed analysis
therefore offers more comprehensive protection of individual autonomy and will thereby
have a greater impact on sexual norms, consistent with basic concepts of personal autonomy,
public health, and social policy.
193. For example, people who engage in one-night stands would probably find it difficult
to prove that their sexual choice rested on factual assumptions regarding monogamy.
Realistically, informed consent would only be required in established relationships where a
minimal duty of candor is reasonable according to normative social expectations.

Notes & Observations

